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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,

Case No. 20030638-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from three enhanced second degree felony convictions for
possession of psilocin, hydrocodone, and Demerol, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(2)(a)(i), (4)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where trial counsel affirmatively approved the very jury instructions
appellate counsel challenges, is defendant's claim of plain error precluded by the
invited error doctrine?
Because defendant's trial counsel affirmatively approved the instructions he
challenges on appeal (see R507:148), his claims amount to invited error and are, therefore,
procedurally barred. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,ffi[52-56, 70 P.3d 111. The invited
error rule not only "fortifies [the] long-established policy that the trial court should have the

first opportunity to address the claim of error," but it also "discourages parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on
appeal." Id. at ^ 54 (quotations omitted).
2(a)* Was the search warrant affidavit adequate to establish (1) defendant's
acceptance of the mushrooms as the only event necessary to trigger the anticipatory
search warrant's validity, and (2) probable cause to believe the mushrooms and other
drugs would be found in defendant's residence?
In reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, the appellate court
"assess[es] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause
existed." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, \ 14, 48 P.3d 872 (citations omitted), cert denied,
535 U.S. 1062 (2002). The Court "afford[s] the magistrate's decision great deference and
considers] the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a common sense
fashion. Id. (citations omitted).
2(b). Was trial counsel ineffective because he declined to make futile challenges
to the anticipatory search warrant's validity?
"Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a mixed question." Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994). If a trial court has previously ruled on a claim of
ineffectiveness, the reviewing court defers to the trial court's findings of fact, but reviews its
legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah App. 1995).
If ineffectiveness is raised first on appeal, the record must be adequate to permit a decision.

2

State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 9, 12 P.3d 92. The issue presents a question of law. State
v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 264 (Utah App. 1995).
3, Did the trial court properly reject defendant's new trial motion alleging that
the State failed to disclose material information about the confidential informant's
cooperation and/or that trial counsel performed ineffectively in not pursuing this line
of inquiry?
The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, but "[a]ny legal determinations made by the trial court as a basis for its denial of
a new trial motion are reviewed for correctness." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, % 8, 994 P.2d
1237.
4. Did the trial court erroneously allow evidence of defendant's drug-related
indiscretions under rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence?
Defendant purports to identify ten instances where evidence was admitted in violation
of the above rules. Aplt. Br. at 43 n.19. However, eight of his allegations of error under rule
402, and all ten of his claims of error under rules 403 and 404(b) are unpreserved. Because
defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance of counsel, these claims are
now procedurally barred. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989); State
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
Defendant arguably preserved relevancy challenges in two instances: to evidence of
his suicide attempts and prior mushroom use. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude
evidence on grounds of relevance will be upheld absent an abuse of the lower court's
3

discretion. State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, ^ 34, 44 P.3d 805. Notably, uthe standard for
determining whether evidence is relevant is so low, the issue of whether evidence is relevant
is rarely an issue." State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, U 13, 973 P.2d 404.
5, Has defendant shown that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a
Miranda issue where defendant has failed to provide supporting citation to the record?
Defendant fails to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with citation
to the record; therefore, the claim is inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that
ground. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Wareham, 772
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's
brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). Moreover,
"[w]here the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively."
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17, 12 P.3d 92.
6. Do defendant's multiple and unsubstantiated claims of prejudicial error
require reversal of the jury verdict under the cumulative error doctrine?
Whether the cumulative effect of individually harmless errors requires reversal turns
on whether the errors as a whole undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Colwell,
2000UT8,1J44,994P.2d 177.

4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath, or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with three enhanced second degree felonies for possession of
psilocin, hydrocodone, and Demerol, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),
(4)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003). R142-143. Following a three-day jury trial on 20-22 November
2002, defendant was convicted as charged. R202. The trial court imposed three concurrent
statutory terms of one-to-fifteen years. R213-215. The trial court then suspended the
statutory terms and placed defendant on probation. Id,
Defendant filed a timely new trial motion, which the trial court denied in a written
ruling on 28 July 2003. R480-485 (a copy is attached in addendum E).
Defendant timely appealed. R487.

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
After investigating defendant's drug-related activities for approximately two months,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted a warrant-supported search of
defendant's residence on 20 April 2002. See R83-87 (a copy of the search warrant and
affidavit is attached in addendum A). That search yielded psilocin mushrooms, hydrocodone
and demerol. R506:157-159.
Lisa Comes Forward, The DEA began investigating defendant based on information
obtained from an employee in defendant's Moab Family Practice Clinic, Lisa LaPlante.
R506:66-68. Lisa first contacted law enforcement in late January 2002 with information
about defendant's illicit drug-related activities. Id. Lisa was upset that defendant had
reported her husband, Gene LaPlante, to police for assaulting her. Id. According to Lisa,
Gene's "total behavior had changed" after he began taking Oxycontin given to him by
defendant over a period of five or six months. R506:67, 90. Lisa was angry with defendant
because she "had been begging [defendant] for help for months, and he didn't ever help."
R506:93. Lisa decided to go to the police with her concerns about defendant after reading
his statement regarding Gene's assault:
Most of what was written on the statement as being my words was actually
[defendant's] words, and I felt I needed to justify that my husband had never
been in trouble. He was basically what I felt losing his mind, and I needed to
explain to them that, you know, we were - -1 was seeking [defendant's] help

l

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying
defendant's motion to suppress, see State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App.
1997), and to the jury verdict, see State v. Litherhand, 2000 UT 76, ^ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
6

all along, and I felt he had turned at the most critical point in my husband's
care.
R506:66, 68-69. Lisa agreed to became a confidential informant in approximately March
2002. R506:69, 143. Although charged with felony assault, Gene was ultimately allowed
to plead guilty to a reduced charge of brandishing a firearm. R506:67, 92-93. Lisa and
Gene have since sued defendant for malpractice. R506:93-94.
Lisa's Observations. Lisa told law enforcement that Cindy Drew, her long-time
friend and defendant's girlfriend, introduced her to defendant in January 2001. R506:85.
Defendant and Cindy hired Lisa to do transcription work in defendant's clinic. R506:60. By
July 2001, Lisa was promoted to office manager. R506:61,86. While working at the clinic,
Lisa observed that defendant told some patients to return their unused medications to his
office, if "it didn't agree with them, or they were getting a different kind." R506:62. The
returned medications "usually went on a shelf or in a drawer." Id. Lisa mentioned her
concerns about the propriety of this practice to defendant and tried to maintain a log of those
patients returning medication "so that I wasn't responsible, 'cause I was taking it, and gave
it to him." R506:63. Defendant continued the practice over Lisa's objections. Id. It was
some of this returned medication that defendant provided, on at least two occasions, to Lisa's
husband Gene, still with the original patient's name on the bottle. R506:63-64.
On one occasion, Lisa found defendant sleeping in a back room of the clinic, "and
there was like a tourniquet on the floor and bent needles on the floor. There were times he
just was acting weird all day, walking almost into walls. Be doing his dictation at night and

7

not recall who he had seen or why, and he had to be reminded by office staff." R506:64-65.
Lisa further reported that Cindy, who also worked in the clinic, told her that she
(Cindy) and defendant took hallucinogenic mushrooms:
I just remember I was sitting at my desk, and Cindy said, we're going to be
closed tomorrow, which I believe was like on a Wednesday or something like
that, and she said that they had some mushrooms, and they were going to take
the day off and go do mushrooms. I remember specifically because I swung
around in my chair and said, what?
R506:66.
Defendant's Recorded Inculpatory Statements. In March 2002 Lisa was contacted
by Agent Johnson of the DEA. R506:69, 143. Johnson asked Lisa to cooperate with his
investigation: "Basically to keep observing what was going on." R506:70. Toward the end
of April, Lisa and Johnson discussed "[her] going in and talking to [defendant] about what
he thought of [her] doing mushrooms." R506:71. Wearing a hidden recording device, Lisa
engaged defendant in a conversation about mushrooms. R506:72, 144-145. Specifically,
Lisa mentioned that her brother was coming to town, and that he wanted her to take
hallucinogenic mushrooms with him. R506:73. When Lisa asked defendant if that would
be safe, defendant responded that "he had taken them plenty of times," that "he had done
them in the clinic," and that mushrooms were "not like pot, where it stays in your system for
a long time, that's why he chooses to do them." R506:74. See also R501:Exh. #7 at 12-13,
29-32.2 Defendant also admitted being "on 'shrooms most of the day [he] was in the clinic,"

2

R501 is a manilla envelope containing Exh. ## 1, 6-9
8

and that "that's really why they fired [him] from the hospital actually. Drugs." Exh. # 7 at
13. As Lisa prepared to leave, defendant twice inquired if her brother had any "extra"
mushrooms that he could buy. R506:75. See R501:Exh. # 7 at 33.
On another occasion, while visiting Cindy at the house she shared with defendant,
Lisa observed Demerol in their refrigerator. R506:78. On yet another occasion, when
neither Cindy nor defendant were present, Lisa observed a prescription bottle of hydrocodone
for patient Robert Silver in their bathroom medicine cabinet. Id.
When defendant's clinic closed in March 2002, Lisa assisted defendant and Cindy in
packing up the medications and other items in the clinic. R506:79. While Lisa delivered the
packages to defendant's residence, she did not assist in carrying them inside. Id.
The Anticipatory Search Warrant Affidavit. Johnson prepared an anticipatory search
warrant for "controlled substances, including, but not limited to, psiloc[in] mushrooms" in
defendant's residence. R84, add. A. See also R501:Exh. # 1 (search warrant).
The probable cause statement stated:
On January 21,2002, CI gave a statement to law enforcement outlining
Penn's improper use of his DEA license in prescribing narcotics. CI said when
a prescription is filled under a staff member's name, it is shared with Dr. Penn
and other staff. CI said narcotics are left out on Dr. Penn's shelf or in his desk
drawer or filing cabinet. CI said Dr. Penn has seen patients while he was
under the influence of narcotics and to the extent that staff members had to
remind him of why he saw the patients so he could dictate because he could
not remember. CI said pharmacies often call because prescriptions are wrong
or are written for the wrong amounts or doses. CI said one patient had med
boxes in the office and the medications were gone before they should have
been, so to make up for the missing meds, Dr. Penn called in a new
prescription with an increase in dosage. CI said Dr. Penn sent out letters
stating he would no longer prescribe [Ojxycontin, but yet he continued to
9

prescribe [Ojxycontin. CI said a patient brought five Duragesic patches and
four came up missing. On January 30, 2002, CI said Cindy Drew told her that
they were closing early the next day because she and Dr. Penn were going to
do mushrooms. The DEA was contacted with his information.
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence described above
as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, and saw some multi-dose
vials of Demerol in their refrigerator. CI also saw some [Ojxycontin in a
prescription bottle, labeled with the name of Robert Silver, in the bathroom.
On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and CI went to the above
described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew about the side effects of using
mushrooms. CI said CI's brother had some mushrooms that CI was
considering trying. Penn and Drew gave CI their opinion of how safe
mushrooms were and said it was good. They described how mushrooms
would make CI feel which was based on their past experience of using
mushrooms. Penn then said to CI[,] if he stocked any extra, we 11 buy it. Drew
then said they got theirs from the northwest. Penn then said again, If he's got
any extra, I11 buy some from him. Penn then said again, If he fs got any extra,
III buy some from him. Penn then said, enough for two of us. Drew then said,
Well, 111 buy somefor Dave too, cuz I owe Dave a favor and he wanted some.3
Dr. Nathaniel Penn and Cindy Drew live together in the above
described residence and said residence is within a drug free zone.
R86-87, add. A (emphasis in original).
The affidavit also included a paragraph anticipating events to occur on 20 April 2002,
the date Lisa returned to defendant's residence with an undercover DEA agent posing as her
brother. R506:190-191. The validity of the anticipatory search warrant was conditioned
"upon the occurrence of the events described in the affidavit." R84, add. A.
ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION: On April 20, 2002, between 1000 and
noon, DEA agents will meet with CI. CI and an undercover agent (UC) will

3

At trial, Lisa and Johnson testified that this conversation occurred on 12 April
2002. &eR506:73-76, 145-148.
10

be searched and CI will be wired. CI or UC will be given some psilocybin
mushrooms. CI's vehicle will also be searched. CI and an undercover agent
will drive in CI's vehicle to the above described residence of Penn and Drew
with the mushrooms. Agents will have CI and UC under visual and audio
observation at all times driving to and from said residence. They will have CI
and UC under audio observation while they are in the residence. It is
anticipated that CI and UC will offer Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for
sale for either cash and/or controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC
leave the residence, CI and UC and CI's vehicle will be re-searched.
R87, add. A.
Based on the affidavit, the magistrate determined there was probable cause to believe
that psilocin and other narcotics would be discovered inside defendant's residence on 20
April 2002. Id. The magistrate signed the warrant on 19 April 2002. Id.
The Mushroom Exchange.

When Lisa and the undercover agent arrived at

defendant's residence on the morning of 20 April 2002, he was alone. R506:82, 191-192.
Lisa introduced the two men and the agent posing as Lisa's brother asked defendant if he was
interested in buying some mushrooms. R506:82. See also R501:Exh. # 8 at 1. Defendant
responded affirmatively. Id. Quality and pricing were discussed and defendant purchased
and received two bags of hallucinogenic mushrooms. R506:83,190. Although the undercover
agent initially asked defendant to trade Lortab or hydrocodone for the mushrooms, defendant
declined, preferring to paying $80 cash instead. R506:83-84,156, 192-193. See also
R501 :Exh. # 8 at 2-3. Once the mushroom exchange was complete, Lisa and the agent left.
R506:193.
The Search. Officers waiting to execute the search warrant overheard the completed
mushroom exchange and moved in immediately. R506:155-157, 163, 190, 195. Once the
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area was secured, the house was searched. Id. Defendant was asked to cooperate with the
search, but initially denied buying any mushrooms. R506:157. Eventually, defendant
admitted buying the mushrooms and indicated they could be found in a kitchen drawer. Id.
A further search of the house yielded a prescription bottle of hydrocodone tablets for
Robert Silver. R506:159. Of the 80 tablets prescribed, only eight remained. Id. An
injectable 20 millimeter bottle of Demerol, with about 15 millimeters remaining, was found
inside the refrigerator. Id.
Motion to Suppress Denied. Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence
seized. R76-81 (a copy of the motion to suppress and memorandum is contained in
addendum B). A hearing on the motion was held on 30 October 2002. R504 (a copy of the
suppression hearing transcript is contained in addendum C). Defendant alleged that the
anticipatory search warrant was invalid (1) because it contained "no statement or assurance
that [djefendant would purchase the substance," and (2) because Lisa's observations of
controlled substances in his bathroom and kitchen were unlawful. R80, add. B; R504:15,1823, add. C. The trial court received transcriptions and recordings of the conversations
between Lisa, Cindy and/or defendant, but heard no witnesses. R504:7-8, add. C. See
R501:Exh. ## 6-8. Following the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress in an oral ruling. R504:15, 18-31, add. C.
Motion for New Trial Denied. Following his jury conviction, defendant filed a
motion for new trial alleging that: (1) the elements instructions were plainly erroneous; (2)
the search warrant was invalid because the triggering event did not occur and Lisa's illegal
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observation of drugs should have been stricken therefrom; (3) the State failed to disclose
material information about Lisa's cooperation with law enforcement and/or trial counsel
performed ineffectively by not pursuing this line of inquiry; and (4) trial counsel performed
ineffectively in not raising a Miranda issue. R235-25L R336-352 (a copy of the new trial
motion, supporting memorandum, and supplemental memorandum are attached in addendum
D). The State filed a written response. R410-421. A hearing was held on 8 July 2003.
R505. Thereafter, the trial court denied the new trial motion. R481-486, add. E.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

Trial counsel affirmed the instructional language appellate counsel

challenges on appeal; accordingly, defendant's plain error claim is precluded by the invited
error doctrine.
Point II. The affidavit in support of the anticipatory search warrant provides a
substantial basis from which the trial court—and the magistrate—properly determined that
the triggering event for the warrant's validity was defendant's acceptance of the mushrooms,
and that there was probable cause to believe that hallucinogenic mushrooms and other
controlled substances would be found inside defendant's residence on the specified date. The
trial court's—and the magistrate's—probable cause determination is supportable even if
Lisa's observations of Oxycontin and Demerol are excised from the affidavit.
Trial counsel was not ineffective in not making futile challenges to the affidavit
regarding (1) Lisa's reliability because the only reasonable inference was that she was a
clinic employee and family friend uniquely situated to observe first-hand defendant's drug13

related indiscretions; or (2) law enforcement's failure to re-search Lisa prior to executing the
warrant because such a search was unnecessary to establish probable cause or the warrant's
validity.
Finally, even if the search warrant is deemed invalid, the search was still justified on
the alternative grounds of probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Point III.

Defendant's new trial motion alleged that the State failed to disclose

material information about Lisa's cooperation, or alternatively, that trial counsel performed
ineffectively in not pursuing this line of inquiry. The trial court properly rejected these
claims based on its findings that trial counsel in fact introduced evidence of Gene LaPlante's
assault charge and its disposition and used this evidence strategically at trial. Defendant has
not attempted, let alone shown, that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.
In any event, defendant concedes that trial counsel presented sufficient evidence for
the jury to infer that Lisa cooperated with the DEA here in exchange for a favorable
disposition of Gene's case. Thus, the crux of defendant's complaint is not so much about a
discovery violation as it is that trial counsel failed to make express what he had already made
implicit by introducing evidence of the disposition of the felony charge against Gene. That
appellate counsel may propose an equally reasonable strategy or argument is insufficient to
overcome the heavy presumption that counsel acted reasonably.
Point IV. Defendant identifies ten instances where he alleges "bad acts" evidence
was admitted in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 402,403, and 404(b). But trial counsel
arguably timely objected only twice, and then only on relevance grounds. Thus, the bulk of
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defendant's claims, including all of his claims under rules 404(b) and 403, are unpreserved.
Because defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance of counsel, these
claims are also procedurally barred. Finally, while defendant arguably timely preserved
relevancy challenges to evidence of his suicide attempts and prior mushroom use, he fails to
demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting this evidence, or that it was
unfairly prejudicial.
Point V. Defendant cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
a Miranda issue where defendant himself has failed to point to record support for his claim.
Even assuming defendant's brief is deemed adequate, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice.
Therefore, his ineffectiveness claim fails.
Point VI. Defendant's multiple unsubstantiated claims do not require reversal under
the cumulative error doctrine.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE VERY
INSTRUCTIONAL LANGUAGE HE CHALLENGES ON APPEAL;
THEREFORE, HIS CLAIM OF PLAIN ERROR IS PRECLUDED BY
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges elements instructions ## 3 and 6 as plainly
erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 20. But as found by the trial court in ruling on defendant's new trial
motion, defendant invited the very errors of which he complains on appeal by affirmatively
approving the language below. See R507:148; R484-485, add. E. Therefore, defendant's
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plain error claim is precluded by the invited error doctrine. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22, IN 52-56, 70 P.3d 111.
Proceedings Below.

At the conclusion of the second day of trial, outside the

presence of the jury, the trial court proposed instructing the jury regarding defendant's
alleged illicit possession of hydrocodone (count II) and Demerol (count III) as follows:
Now, what I - - just what I've worked out at this point on that subject
is physicians licensed or practiced to prescribe controlled substances must still
obtain a prescription for controlled substances for personal use. Physicians
licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances are also permitted to
possess reasonable quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record of controlled
substances received for that purpose and dispensed or administered by them
as physicians. A physician who fails to follow this requirement is possessing
those substances illegally.
And that relates back to an element in the instruction, elements in the
instruction I say that the State has to prove that it was possessed without a
prescription or without otherwise complying. That sound about right to you?
(Inaudible) actual language?
R507:147-148 (copies of pertinent transcript pages are attached as addendum F) (emphasis
added). Defendant's trial counsel responded, "Right. I think so." R507:148, add. F. The
trial court concluded, "Okay. Those are the only things that I had questions about before I
start the typewriter going. Anything either of you want to bring out at this point that I can
try to incorporate in the instructions that's kind of popped up since?" Id. Neither party
expressed concern about the elements instructions at that time, see R507:148-149, add. F,
or the next day when the trial court again invited the parties' comments on the now written
instructions, see R508:3-9, add. F.
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The trial court incorporated the approved language for counts II and III into jury
instructions # 3 and # 6:
INSTRUCTION NO. 34
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as follows: . . .
COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE IN A
DRUG FREE ZONE
1. That on or about April 20, 2002,
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed hydrocodone,
3. In a drug free zone,
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with the law.
COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEMEROL IN A DRUG
FREE ZONE
1. That on or about April 20, 2002,
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed demerol,
3. In a drug free zone,
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with the law.

INSTRUCTION NO. 6
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must still obtain
a prescription for any controlled substances for personal use. Physicians
licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances are also permitted to
possess reasonable quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record of controlled
substances received for that purpose and dispensed or administered by them
as physicians. A physician who fails to comply with this requirement
possesses those substances illegally.

4

Because defendant does not challenge the elements of count I (psilocin), that
language is not set forth here.
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R184, 188 (copies of the jury instructions are attached in addendum G) (contested language
emphasized). See also R508:12-13 (jury instructions # 3 and # 6 read to jury).
Defendant first challenged instructions # 3 and # 6 as plainly erroneous in his motion
for new trial. R217, 238, 240-243, add. D. The trial court rejected his claim, ruling that
defendant's decision to "accept language that was arguably more favorable than other
alternatives [was] not objectively unreasonable." R485, add. E. The trial court further ruled
that "[defendant] [could not] now be permitted to second guess that decision and obtain a
new trial with a different instruction, followed if necessary by a third trial with yet a third
version of the instructions." Id.
Invited Error. Notwithstanding his affirmation of the instructional language in the
trial court, defendant claims on appeal that instructions # 3 and # 6 plainly misstate the
possession statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003)),
"effectively creating a new crime that violated due process." Aplt. Br. at 18.
Ordinarily, a party cannot challenge a jury instruction on appeal without preserving
an objection in the trial court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). Where a party fails to object
below, the instruction is reviewable only for "manifest injustice" or plain error. Id. See State
v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) ("Where reviewing a claim of manifest
injustice, [this Court] generally use[s] the same standard that is applied to determine whether
plain error exists under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence."). As set forth recently
by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]o review an instruction under the manifest injustice
exception, counsel must have failed to object to the instruction." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^|
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54 (emphasis in original). If however, "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate
court] will not review the instruction'' even under the manifest injustice or plain error
exception. Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)). Indeed, to do
so would be to invite error. The invited error rule "prevents a party from 'tak[ing] advantage
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'"
Id. (quoting Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah
1993)). See also State v. Perdue, &\3?.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to review
claim of constitutional error in reasonable doubt instruction, under the invited error doctrine).
Given the above, defendant's plain error claim is precluded by the invited error
doctrine. Defendant did not merely fail to object to the contested language of instructions
# 3 and # 6; rather, when the trial court asked if the proposed language "sound[ed] about
right," defendant's trial counsel responded, "Right. I think so." R507:147-148, add. F. Thus,
any possible error was invited by defendant's affirmation of the language. His claim of
instructional error may not now be reviewed even under the manifest injustice or plain error
standard. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54.
POINT II
EVIDENCE THAT A WARRANT-SUPPORTED SEARCH OF
DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE YIELDED PSILOCIN, HYDROCODONE
AND DEMEROL WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to suppress the psilocin, hydrocodone and Demerol found during a warrant-supported
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search of his house. Aplt. Br. at 27-36. Defendant alleges that the trial court erroneously
refused to suppress this evidence because the anticipatory search warrant arguably authorized
a search even if he had refused the psilocin mushrooms, and because the affidavit was based
in part on Lisa's alleged illegal observations of Demerol and Oxycontin in his residence.
Aplt. Br. at 30, 32. Defendant further complains that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the search warrant on the additional grounds that: (1) the "requisite
'triggering events' did not occur" because police did not re-search Lisa or the undercover
agent prior to executing the search warrant, and (2) Lisa's veracity and reliability as a
confidential informant was not established in the affidavit. Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant's
claims lack merit and should be rejected.
Proceedings Below. Trial counsel moved to suppress the narcotics seized alleging
that the search warrant affidavit contained "no statement or assurance that [d]efendant would
purchase the substance," or, in other words, that there was no assurance defendant would
have the mushrooms "in his possession" when the search warrant was executed. R80, add.
B. At a hearing held on 30 October 2002, trial counsel raised the additional challenge that
information regarding Lisa's observations of Demerol and Oxycontin were illegal because
she was acting an agent of the State. R504:15, 18-23, add. C.
In addition to hearing the parties' arguments, see R504:15, 18-29, add. C, the trial
court received as exhibits, transcriptions of the recorded conversations between Lisa and
defendant wherein defendant offered to buy any "extra" mushrooms, and then bought
mushrooms from the undercover DEA agent. R504:7-8. See R501:Exh. ## 6-8.
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Thereafter, the trial court rejected defendant's claims in an oral ruling, finding that the
anticipatory nature of the warrant did not render it invalid because it was conditioned on
"specific events." R504:29, add. C. And, even if information regarding Lisa's observations
of drugs in the kitchen and bathroom was excised, there was "ample probable cause . . . to
support the issuance of the warrant. So I'm going to deny the motion." Id.
Trial counsel nevertheless argued that if the trial court excised Lisa's observations of
Oxycontin and Demerol from the warrant, "there's no reason for them to be looking in the
bathroom cabinet and the refrigerator, because they were directed immediately to the
mushrooms, which were really, at that point, the only focus of the warrant that's left."
R504:29-30, add. C. The trial court accordingly clarified his ruling:
I think the warrant would-once there's probable cause to believe that
there is some in the house, I think they're entitled to look everywhere in the
house. I think that's pretty well established.
So having considered that argument, and even if I-if you had the
opportunity to present that evidence, it would not change my ruling with
respect to the evidence that was eventually seized.
R504:30, add. C.
Following his jury conviction, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress in his new trial motion. R217-218, 235-250, 336-353, add. D. In
addition to renewing his complaint that the anticipatory search warrant failed to identify a
triggering event, defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
(1) the triggering event did not occur because police failed to re-search Lisa, the undercover
DEA agent, or their vehicle before executing the warrant, (2) the affidavit failed to establish
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Lisa's veracity and reliability as a confidential informant, and (3) "some of the information
contained in the affidavit was based on an illegal search." Id.
The trial court declined to reconsider arguments it had previously ruled on and found
defendant's new claim to lack merit. R480, add. E. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the
search warrant affidavit sufficiently established that the triggering event was defendant's
"acceptance of the offer," and therefore the validity of the warrant was not conditioned on
police re-searching Lisa, the DEA agent, or their car. R481, add. E. The trial court did not
address defendant's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising this and other
challenges to the search warrant. R480-481, add. E.
A.

The trial court—and the magistrate—properly determined that a
common sense reading of the affidavit identified defendant's
acceptance of the mushrooms as the triggering event that would
justify the anticipatory warrant's execution.

In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant complains that the trial court improperly
"attempted to read the mind of the magistrate" by ruling that, '"even though the affidavit
failed to recite that the officers expected [defendant] to accept the offer of drugs, . . . the
magistrate clearly intended that acceptance of the offer would be the trigger for execution of
the warrant, and the conduct of the officers shows that they understood this as well/" Aplt.
Br. at 28 (quoting R481, add. E). The trial court's—and the magistrate's—common sense
reading of the affidavit should be upheld.
Totality of the circumstances. A challenge to a search warrant is governed by the
"totality of the circumstances" standard articulated over twenty years ago in Illinois v. Gates,
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462 U.S. 213 (1983). Gates held that kfc[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make
a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place." Id. at 238 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained that in
determining probable cause, courts simply deal with probabilities—'"the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians
act.'" Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). See also
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1331 (10th Cir. 2003) ("A
magistrate's issuance of a warrant must be evaluated in accordance with 'practical,
commonsense' considerations") (quoting Gates, A62 U.S. at 238)).
The Supreme Court further observed that "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for... concluding]' that probable cause
existed." Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (I960)); accord
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993). In other words, "after-the-fact
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo
review." Id. at 236 (internal quotes and citations omitted); accord State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d
987, 991 (Utah 1989). Rather, a reviewing court should pay "great deference" to the
magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. at 236; accord Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991. "A
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants is inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Id. at
236 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Gates thus held that "'the resolution of doubtful
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or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded
to wanmtsr" Id. at237nA0 (quoting United States^ Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,109(1965)).
Anticipatory Search Warrants- The above principles apply even if a search warrant
affidavit, as here, anticipates that probable cause—absent at the time the warrant is
issued—will exist prior to the warrant's execution or the search. See Hernandez-Rodriguez,
352 F.3d at 1331 ("This Court has rejected any suggestion that an affidavit in support of an
anticipatory warrant must be subjected to closer scrutiny than an affidavit seeking the
issuance of a warrant which would be effective immediately") (quoting United States v.
Hugoboom, 112F.3d 1081,1086 (10th Cir. 1997)). See State v. Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 543
(Utah App. 1998) (reviewing an anticipatory affidavit "as a whole and with a 'common
sense' orientation, deferring to the magistrate'^ decision"). Unlike a non-anticipatory
warrant, "[p]robable cause to support anticipatory warrants is conditioned on the occurrence
of certain expected or triggering events, typically the future delivery, sale, or purchases of
contraband." Womack, 967 P.2d at 543 (citations omitted). If the anticipated event does not
occur, probable cause is not established and the anticipatory warrant is invalid. Id.
Because the existence of probable cause in an anticipatory warrant "depends on
whether certain events occur," the affidavit "must state conditions allowing the search to be
done only after those expected events occur." Id. To protect against "premature execution
of the warrant," and to ensure "judicial control over the probable cause determination," the
"conditions controlling the warrant's execution '"should be explicit, clear, and narrowly
drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents."'" Id. at 544
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(quoting United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-704 (2nd Cir. 1989))). Nevertheless, "the specificity
with which the magistrate should state the conditions dictating the warrant's execution will
shift depending on the facts of each case/' Id.
This case. While the affidavit here could have been more artfully drafted, a common
sense reading identifies defendant's acceptance of the mushrooms as the triggering event that
would justify the search warrant's execution. Indeed, the affidavit quotes from a recorded
conversation between Lisa and defendant approximately two weeks before the anticipatory
search warrant was issued on 19 April 2002, wherein defendant twice offered to purchase
any "extra" mushrooms Lisa's brother might have:
[Defendant] then said to [Lisa] If he stocked any extra, we'll buy it. [Cindy]
then said they got theirs from the Northwest. [Defendant] then said again, If
he's got any extra, I'll buy some from him. [Defendant] then said, enough for
two of us. [Cindy] then said, Well, I'll buy some for Dave too, cuz I owe Dave
a favor and he wanted some.
R86, add. A (emphasis in original).
The above paragraph must be read together with a subsequent "anticipatory
paragraph" which provides that on 20 April 2002, Lisa and an undercover DEA agent posing
as her brother will "offer [defendant] and/or [Cindy] the mushrooms for sale for either cash
and/or controlled substance prescriptions. After [Lisa] and the [undercover agent] leave the
residence, [Lisa] and [the undercover agent] will be re-searched." R87,add. A. Because the
affidavit indicates the undercover agent will be wearing a hidden recording device, the
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issuing magistrate knew police could monitor the transaction and thus know when or whether
defendant accepted the mushrooms. Id.
When read together, the above paragraphs sufficiently establish that there was no
event other than defendant's acceptance of the offered mushrooms that could or would
establish probable cause to believe he then possessed them. Therefore, the trial court—and
the magistrate—properly determined that the affidavit sufficiently identified defendant's
acceptance of the mushrooms as the triggering event or condition precedent to the warrant's
validity, even though such is not expressly stated therein. R481, add. E. See Womack, 967
P.2d at 544 ("the specificity with which the magistrate should state the conditions dictating
the warrant's execution will shift depending on the facts of each case").
Moreover, there is no evidence police mistook the triggering event or otherwise
manipulated the affidavit in order to perform an unjustified search. Id. To the contrary, at
trial, Special Agent Bacon affirmed trial counsel's representations that the "anticipatory
event was you selling [defendant] mushrooms, correct?" and "[h]ad you not been able to do
that, you could not have gone into the house and searched the house correct?" R506:195.5

5

Most appellate courts (Utah has no rule), in reviewing the denial of a pretrial
motion, consider only evidence before the court at the time of the pretrial motion. See
United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hicks, 978
F.2d 722, 724-725 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v. State, 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992);
State v. Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-789 (Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229,
1232 (Md. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979).
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a pretrial
ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of affirming a
pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1239-1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey,
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Nor does defendant dispute that he in fact accepted the mushrooms prior to the search
warrant's execution. See R505:41. Had police in fact acted prematurely here, before
defendant accepted the mushrooms, suppression would have been an available remedy.
Womack, 967 P.2d at 543. Because police properly waited until after defendant accepted the
mushrooms, they acted in accord with the only viable triggering event identified in the
anticipatory affidavit. R481, add. E. The search was therefore justified and suppression is
unwarranted.
B.

Even excising Lisa's observations of Demerol and
Oxycontin, the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
that mushrooms and other controlled substances would be
found inside defendant's residence.

In Point 11(C)(1) of his brief, defendant asserts that "because [Lisa's] search was
improper, [] information obtained as a result should have been stricken," and that absent that
information, "there [was] absolutely no basis to search [his] home for [D]emerol,
hydrocodone, or any other medically prescribed controlled substance."6 Aplt. Br. at 34. As

816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054-1055, n.l
(La. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1994). Contra State
v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Haw. App. 1994) (reversal). The principle unifying these
cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but will not reverse, a ruling based on
evidence not before the district court at the time it ruled. The State is aware of no
jurisdiction that has adopted a rule that an appellate court may reverse a pretrial ruling
based only on evidence presented at trial.
defendant's new trial motion asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise this claim below. See R347, see add. D. Defendant does not reassert this
particular claim of ineffectiveness on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 33-34, 36-37, apparently
recognizing that trial counsel in fact unsuccessfully challenged the warrant's validity
based on the inclusion of Lisa's alleged illegal observations of Demerol and Oxycontin in
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set forth above, the trial court excised Lisa's observations of Demerol and Oxycontin and
found there was still probable cause to search for mushrooms and other controlled
substances. R504:29-20, add. C; R506:99-102; R481, add. E. That correct ruling should be
upheld.
Here, the search warrant authorized police to look for mushrooms and other controlled
substances. See R84, add. A. Considering the affidavit as a whole, and even excising the
paragraph about Lisa's observations of Demerol and Oxycontin inside defendant's house,
there remained probable cause to search for controlled substances in addition to the psilocin
mushrooms defendant had just purchased. The first paragraph of section five of the affidavit,
for example, identifies multiple drug-related improprieties observed by Lisa while working
at defendant's clinic, including two instances of missing medication:
. . . CI said when a prescription is filled under a staff member's name, it is
shared with [defendant] and other staff. CI said narcotics are left out on
[defendant's] shelf or in his desk drawer or filing cabinet. CI said [defendant]
has seen patients while he under the influence of narcotics and to the extent
that staff members had to remind him of why he saw the patients so he could
dictate because he could not remember. CI said pharmacies often call because
prescriptions are wrong or are written for the wrong amounts or doses. CI said
one patient had med boxes in the office and the medications were gone before
they should have been, so to make up for the missing meds, [defendant] called
in a new prescription with an increase in dosage. CI said [defendant] sent out
letters stating he would no longer prescribe [0]xycontin, but yet he continued
to prescribe [0]xycontin. CI said a patient brought in five Duragesic patches
and four came up missing.
R86, add. A (emphasis added).

the affidavit below. See R504:29-30, add. B; R506:99-i02.
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This paragraph gives rise to a fair inference that medication missing from defendant's
clinic may be found, along with the mushrooms, inside his residence. Indeed, police had
probable cause to believe defendant a doctor, had previously used and possessed at least one
controlled substance (psilocin) in his house. Id. If, as suggested in the affidavit, defendant
was also involved in removing medication from his clinic, it is a fair inference that he was
storing the missing medication for his personal use at his house. See Womack, 967 P.2d at
543 (reviewing an anticipatory affidavit "as a whole and with a 'common sense' orientation,
deferring to the magistrate's decision"). Thus, once police were lawfully inside pursuant to
the warrant authorizing a search for mushrooms and other controlled substances, see R84,
add. A, they properly searched for medication from defendant's defunct clinic.
C.

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make futile
challenges to the anticipatory search warrant's validity.

In Point 11(B), (C)(2), and (D), of his brief, defendant argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue that (1) "the triggering events necessary to the validity of the
warrant did not occur" because "[t]he re-searching of the named persons and locations clearly
did not take place before the warrant was executed," and (2) the warrant "was completely
void of information concerning the CI." Aplt. Br. at 30-32, 34-36. Thus, defendant broadly
concludes, "the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search [defendant's]
residence." Because these challenge were futile, defendant's ineffectiveness claims fail.
1.

Re-searching Lisa, the undercover DEA agent, and their
vehicle was not a necessary prerequisite to the anticipatory
search warrant's validity.
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As set forth in Point 11(A), supra, a common sense reading of the search warrant
affidavit identifies defendant's acceptance of the mushrooms as the key event necessary to
establish probable cause to believe that he in fact possessed the mushrooms; therefore, it was
the only triggering event which would justify the warrant's execution. See R480-481, add.
E. Although the warrant can arguably be read to require that Lisa, the undercover DEA
agent, and their vehicle be re-searched prior to the warrant's execution, that requirement
added nothing to the probable cause established once police overheard defendant accept the
mushrooms. See R501 :Exh. # 8 at 3. Thus, even if the affidavit is reasonably read to require
that the "re-search" occur prior to the warrant's execution, that requirement is effectively
obviated by the salient fact that probable cause—and the warrant's validity—was previously
established by defendant's recorded acceptance of the mushrooms. See R481, add. E.
Therefore, any objection to the search warrant on this ground would have been futile and
defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to raise it. See State v. Whittle, 1999
UT 96, ^f 34,989 P.2d 52 (holding that the "failure of counsel to make motions or objections
which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance") (quotations and
citations omitted).
2.

The fair inference from the affidavit is that the CI was a
clinic employee and family friend uniquely situated to
observe defendant's drug-related indiscretions.

Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
search warrant affidavit because "there is absolutely no information about the CI provided"
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therein. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Defendant's assertion of ineffectiveness is meritless and should
therefore be rejected.
Even before Lisa was identified as the confidential informant here, the first-hand
observations detailed in the search warrant affidavit gave rise to the fair inference that the
informant had unique access to the inner workings of defendant's clinic and personal
knowledge of his home-life. Indeed, the first paragraph details defendant's drug-related
indiscretions at the clinic including the questionable procuring and sharing of prescriptive
medicine, some of which came up missing on two different occasions, and his apparent drugrelated impairment at the clinic. See R86, add. A. Moreover, defendant's girlfriend shared
personal first-hand information with the informant that "they were closing early the next day
because she and [defendant] were going to do mushrooms." Id. Finally, the affidavit includes
excerpts from a recorded conversation between the informant and defendant at defendant's
residence wherein defendant twice offered to purchase any "extra" mushrooms the
informant's brother may have available. Id.
Based on the above, the affidavit is more than adequate to establish Lisa's veracity
and reliability as the confidential informant. First, while Lisa's identity was not expressly
revealed in the affidavit, police knew with whom they working. Thus, Lisa's reliability is
buttressed by the fact that the police could verify her information and that she may be subject
to penalty if the information was false. See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, f 15,40 P.3d
1136; City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah App. 1997). See also 3 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4 at 204 (3rd ed. 1996) ("Courts are much more concerned
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with veracity when the source of the information is an informant from the criminal milieu
rather than an average citizen who has found himself in the position of a crime victim or
witness").
Additionally, Lisa's information was based on first-hand observation and personal
conversation, some recorded, with defendant and his girlfriend. R86, add. A. See Deluna,
2001 UT App 401, Tf 13 (personal observations of informant sufficient to establish the
informant's basis of knowledge); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992)
("Courts have . . . consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the
informant's knowledge is based on personal observation"). Lisa's first-hand observations
of missing medicine and defendant's drug-related impairment at the clinic, and her
conversation with defendant at his house about purchasing mushrooms are sufficiently
detailed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause to
believe that mushrooms and other controlled substances would be located inside defendant's
residence. Id.
Police also corroborated Lisa's allegations when she wore a hidden recording device
and actually recorded defendant discussing his past use of mushrooms and offering to
purchase any "extra" mushrooms from Lisa's brother. See R86, add. A; R501 :Exh. # 7. See
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, f 20 (police "'may corroborate the tip either by observing the
illegal activity or by finding [the material] facts substantially as described by the informant'")
(quoting Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah App. 1997).
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Given the above, any challenge to Lisa's or the informant's veracity and reliability
was futile; therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to do so.
Whittle,1999 UT 96, \ 34. His ineffectiveness claim should therefore be rejected.
D.

Alternatively, the instant search was justified by probable
cause and exigent circumstances.

Even assuming the Court were to find the anticipatory search warrant was invalid, the
search of defendant's residence was still justified on the alternative grounds of probable
cause and exigent circumstances. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^f 20, 29 P.3d 1225
(affirming on alternative ground apparent as a matter of law). Probable cause is established
because defendant accepted hallucinogenic mushrooms from an undercover DEA agent;
moreover, police knew defendant had been fired from the hospital for using drugs. See
R501:Exh. ## 7-8. Seef e.g., United States v. Allen, 235 F.3d 482, 488 (10th Cir. 2000)
("Probable cause . . . exists when an officer,... is led to a reasonable belief that an offense
has been or is being committed by the suspect"). Exigent circumstances are established
because the mushrooms defendant had just purchased and other controlled substances
suspected to be inside his residence are easily consumed or destroyed. See United States v.
Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The possibility that evidence will be removed or
destroyed [is an] exigent circumstance[] that may excuse an otherwise unconstitutional
intrusion into a residence"); Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 270-71 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
doctrine of exigent circumstances basically encompasses officer safety and the destruction
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of easily-disposed evidence"). See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258-60 (Utah 1987)
(upholding warrantless entry to prevent suspects from flushing drugs down toilet).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S NEW
TRIAL MOTION BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH
THAT THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL
INFORMATION ABOUT LISA'S COOPERATION OR THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY IN NOT FURTHER
PURSUING THIS LINE OF INQUIRY
In Point III of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying the new
trial motion in which he alleged a discovery violation for failure to reveal the conditions of
Lisa's cooperation with the government, and alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel
for failing to investigate or explore the same. Aplt. Br. at 37-42. The trial court soundly
rejected these claims.
Proceedings Below. Trial counsel's opening statement referenced the "very violent
crime" committed against Lisa by her husband, Gene. R506:52. Trial counsel stated that
Gene was prosecuted for that offense and you'll (the jury) hear of the disposition of that
prosecution." Id. Trial counsel also referenced Lisa's anger toward defendant, and her
accusations against him which resulted in the government's solicitation of Lisa's help "to set
[defendant] up." R506:52-53. Trial counsel further suggested that Lisa used her close
friendship with defendant and Cindy to entrap defendant and that she did so "to further her
cause with the government." R506:53-55. Trial counsel went so far as to suggest that it was
Lisa who planted the drugs found during the warrant-supported search of his residence.
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R506:56. Trial counsel concluded that the "government through its angry agent created a
crime where there was no reason for a crime to occur." R506:58.
On cross-examination, trial counsel explored Lisa's anger against defendant which
resulted from his failed treatment of Gene's back pain. R506:90-93. Trial counsel elicited
that Lisa was upset with defendant because she "had been begging [him] for help for months,
and he didn't ever help." Id. Trial counsel specifically elicited that Lisa's husband was
charged with felony assault against her, but was allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge
of brandishing a firearm. R506:92-93. Trial counsel also elicited that Lisa received
approximately $500 from the DEA to cover her moving expenses. R506:109.
During closing argument, trial counsel argued that Lisa used her friendship with
defendant "to do what she need[ed] to do to benefit her cause and that of the government,"
including planting the Demerol and hydrocodone in defendant's residence and manipulating
defendant into purchasing mushrooms. R508:38-39, 41, 43-45.
The jury was instructed that they could "consider the interest which a witness has in
the result of the trial and any bias or motive the witness may have to testify for or against
either side." See R184, Jury Instruction # 12.
As support for his new trial motion, defendant submitted an affidavit from trial
counsel asserting that he first learned post-trial of Lisa's agreement with the State, that
"Gene['s] charges would 'go away' if Lisa [] was willing to act as an informant and witness
against [defendant]." R403. Trial counsel asserted that if he had "been provided the
information regarding the deal between the State and Lisa [], [he] would have presented
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evidence to the jury in regards to the deal and had the court instruct the jury relative to the
reliability of Lisa['s] testimony." R404.
Defendant also submitted post-trial depositions of Lisa and Gene taken in the civil
case against defendant. R505:26. Appellate counsel quoted from Lisa's deposition, showing
that she answered affirmatively when asked if the prosecutor "made it clear to [her] that if
[she] would help them - - by them, I mean the government - - with their investigation of
[defendant], that he would be willing to reduce the charge to basically make the charges
against Gene go away." R505:28.
Following the parties' arguments, the trial court rejected defendant's claim of a
discovery violation or ineffective assistance in a written ruling. See R482-484, add. E. The
trial court implicitly rejected trial counsel's affidavit, to find that trial counsel in fact "elicited
testimony at trial that [Lisa's husband] was permitted to plead guilty" to a lesser offense and
"that his plea was held in abeyance, with eventual dismissal if [Lisa's husband] complied
with certain conditions unrelated to this case." R482, add. E. Based on this finding, the trial
court concluded that trial counsel "knew of the disposition of the charges against [Lisa's
husband]," and that he used this knowledge strategically to portray Lisa as "vindictive,"
"unreasonable ang[ry]" with defendant, and "ungrateful" for [defendant's] generosity."
R483, add. E. The trial court found this strategy reasonable. Id.
Failure to Marshall. On appeal, defendant purports to raise the discovery violation
issue, claiming that "the State never disclosed to the defense the actual deal it had made with
the State's main witness and informant, Lisa LaPlante." Aplt. Br. at 39. Defendant further
36

claims that trial counsel was not made aware "that the DEA had financially compensated"
Lisa. Aplt. Br. at 40. As set forth above, the trial court found that trial counsel was aware
of the charge against Gene and its disposition. In other words, the trial court found there was
no discovery violation. R482-483, add. E. The trial court further found that trial counsel
used this information strategically at trial. R482-483, add. E. In challenging this ruling,
defendant makes no mention of trial counsel's opening statement, cross-examination of Lisa,
or closing argument, all of which demonstrate trial counsel's strategic use of evidence of the
disposition of Gene's felony assault charge, and the DEA's payment of Lisa's moving
expenses. See Aplt. Br. at 37-42. In other words, defendant has not marshaled the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, see, e.g., R506:52-53, 56-58, 90-93, 109; R508:38-39,
41, 43-45, let alone shown that it is inadequate to support the trial court's rejection of the
claimed discovery violation. See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. ,818 P.2d 1311,1315
(Utah App. 1991) ("In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists'').
Defendant's claim of a discovery violation should be rejected on this ground alone. See State
v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 13, 983 P.2d 556 (holding that where appellant makes no
attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, this Court "accepts the
trial court's findings as stated in its ruling").7

7

Defendant also claims that the State failed to turn over "prepared reports of
interviews with Angie Stoughton, Marie Packard, and pharmacist Mike Goyne." Aplt.
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Effective Assistance. In any event, defendant expressly concedes that trial counsel
in fact "questioned [Lisa] about the disposition of her husband's case in hopes that the jury
would infer the plea arrangement was the result of [Lisa's] cooperation and testimony." Aplt.
Br. at 41. Defendant complains that "trial counsel went no further, however, never inquiring
as to whether there was a specific deal that had been made." Id. Thus, it appears that the crux
of defendant's complaint is not so much an alleged discovery violation as it is the
effectiveness of trial counsel.
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
demonstrate that trial counsel's representation was deficient and prejudicial. Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). This Court "need not address both components if
a defendant fails to meet his or her burden on either one." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,
61 (Utah 1993). See also Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,697 (1984) ("If it is easier

Br. at 42. Defendant alleges that the reports "contained material details about the
government's investigation of Penn," but wholly fails to identify what these material
details were. Id. The claim is therefore inadequately briefed and should be rejected. See
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,
966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief
"wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). Moreover, the trial
court rejected this claim when it was raised in defendant's new trial motion. R483-484,
add. E ("The Court has reviewed those written statements, and finds nothing there that
would have helped [defendant] that was not presented to the jury"). Because defendant
does not acknowledge the trial court's finding, let alone attempt to demonstrate any clear
error therein, his claim may be rejected on this ground too. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 13.
Finally, defendant's complaint that the Goyne interview was not turned over is raised for
the first time on appeal. See R483, add. E. It is therefore unpreserved and, in the absence
of a plain error or ineffective assistance claim, it is also procedurally barred. State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995).
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to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed").
Contrary to defendant's claims on appeal, and as set forth above, trial counsel in fact
presented evidence of, and argued, Lisa's motivation to assist the government and her bias
against defendant. See, e.g., R506:52-58, 90-93, 109; R508:38-39, 41, 43-45. Thus,
defendant's complaint is no more than that trial counsel failed to make express what was
already unavoidably implicit—that Lisa cooperated with the government in exchange for a
favorable disposition of the felony charge against Gene. See Aplt. Br. at 41. That appellate
counsel may propose an equally reasonable strategy, i.e., making this unavoidable inference
express, is insufficient to overcome the heavy presumption that trial counsel acted
reasonably. See Parsons, 871 P.2dat 524 (quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1063 (Utah
1991)).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT UNDER RULES 402, 403 AND
404(b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, TO EVIDENCE OF HIS DRUGRELATED MISDEEDS AND HE HAS NOT ARGUED PLAIN ERROR
OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ON APPEAL; THEREFORE, HIS
CLAIMS ARE UNPRESERVED AND PROCEDURALLY BARRED
In Point IV of his brief, defendant asserts that the "trial court erred in allowing highly
prejudicial and unsubstantiated allegations of prior drug use, distribution, inferred
'prescription fraud,' and other allegations over the objection of defense counsel." Aplt. Br.
at 43. Defendant identifies ten instances where this "bad acts" evidence was allegedly
admitted in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 402,403, and 404(b). Aplt. Br. at 43 n.19,
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44 (citing R506:64-66, 136, 149, 153; R507:70-71). But trial counsel arguably timely
objected only twice, and then only on relevance grounds. See R506:64-66, 136, 149, 153;
R507:70-71. The great bulk of defendant's claims, including all of his claims of error under
rules 404(b) and 403, are thus unpreserved. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1f 11,10 P.3d 346;
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993). Because defendant argues neither plain
error or ineffective assistance of counsel these claims are also procedurally barred. State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Finally, while defendant arguably timely
preserved relevancy challenges to evidence of his suicide attempts and prior mushroom use,
he fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's discretion or that this evidence was
unfairly prejudicial.
Proceedings Below. On the first day of trial, 20 November 2002, defendant filed a
motion in limine broadly objecting to "irrelevant statements made by informant, Lisa
LaPlante pursuant to Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence." R139 (a copy of the motion is
contained in addendum H).

Without identifying any specific statement, defendant

complained that "many" of Lisa's statements in the police reports "describing her interactions
and observations of [defendant in his medical practice were "either irrelevant, or if deemed
irrelevant," "unduly prejudicial." Id Trial counsel at no time asked the trial court to rule on
the broad-based motion in limine before or during trial.
Rather, during opening statements, trial counsel referenced Lisa's accusations that
defendant was "illegally prescribing, illegally dealing, if you will, controlled substances,
Oxycontin." R506:53. Essentially characterizing Lisa's accusations as lies, trial counsel told
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the jury that they would "never hear, because it didn't occur, any evidence that in fact that
occurred at all." Id. According to trial counsel, Lisa made the accusations after becoming
"upset with defendant," and that she was recruited by the government to "set [defendant] up."
R506:52-53.
Approximately eight of the ten instances of alleged "bad acts" testimony about which
defendant complains on appeal were introduced without objection from trial counsel. For
example, trial counsel did not object:
•

when Lisa was asked to give an example of behavior which caused her to think
"[defendant] was using controlled substances,"and Lisa related finding
defendant once "in the back room sleeping," with "a tourniquet. . and bent
needles on the floor." R506:65.

•

when Lisa continued that there were other "times [defendant] just was acting
weird all day, walking almost into walls. Be doing his dictation at night and
not recall who had seen or why, and he had to be reminded by office staff." Id.

•

when Lisa was asked why she had stated, "that [she] had to move, had to leave
Moab," and Lisa responded, "[b]ecause there was a lot of people addicted to
OxyContin in town, and now their source for that OxyContin was gone, and
I feared for me and my family." R506:135-136.

•

when Lisa was asked what was causing her husband to "lo[se] his mind," and
Lisa responded, "The OxyContin." R506:136. Nor did trial counsel object to
the prosecutor's follow up question, to which Lisa responded affirmatively:
"That [defendant] had given him?" Id.
when the prosecutor elicited from Agent Johnson that the "DEA's concern []
is if [defendant's] doing illegal drugs, and he's treating patients, that there's
a public safety issue there." R506:149.

•

when Johnson further testified of defendant's questionable practices: "[Ojther
types of controlled substances [] were obtained by writing prescriptions in
office staff members' names and having them bring drugs back to [defendant].
Those drugs may have been shared with office staff members, and also he may
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have been taking them himself. Our concern was he was using them to treat
patients." Id.
•

when Johnson was asked why the DEA sought an anticipatory warrant: "[W]e
had some concerns with what would happen to the evidence if we . . . had to
wait an hour or two to go get the warrant, and we were afraid that some of it
might be ingested, which we didn't want him to do to cause him any harm, and
also any evidence might have been destroyedfromthat time that we made the
transaction to the time we could have gotten the warrant." R506:152-153.

•

to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Cindy, or her affirmative response,
that she recalled hearing defendant tell Lisa that he had been fired from the
hospital because of his drug use. R507:71.

Waiver and Procedural Ban Based on trial counsel's non-objections set forth
above, defendant has failed to preserve his claims of error with regard to any of the above
evidence. Defendant's broad-based motion in limine (filed the first day of trial and never
ruled upon by the trial court), was wholly inadequate to alert the judge that defendant
objected on relevance, or any other grounds, to this evidence which defendant specifically
identifies for the first time on appeal. See R139, add. H. "Utah courts require specific
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate/" Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (quotation
omitted). See also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11 0"[T]he trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'") (quoting State v.
Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29,36 (Utah 1989)). "This specificity requirement arises out of the trial
court's need to assess allegations by isolated relevant facts and considering them in the
context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue. For this reason, a general objection may
be insufficient to preserve a specific substantive issue for appeal." Brown, 856 P.2d at 361
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(citing State v. Elm. 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820821 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 11'4 P.2d 1141, 1144-1145 (Utah 1989)). Accordingly,
because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the alleged errors identified above,
defendant's claims are unpreserved. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 11.
Because defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance his claims are also
procedurally barred. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229.
Even if the broad-based motion in limine is deemed sufficient to preserve at most a
relevance challenge to the above evidence, defendant failed to obtain a ruling on the motion
in limine, thus the relevance issues are still unpreserved. See State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959,
961 (Utah App. 1989) ("Where the court has not a made a ruling on a motion in limine, and
where defendant fails to invoke a ruling on his motion, he has waived the issue for purposes
of appeal"). But see, State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^ 43 n.7, 27 P.3d 1115 (declining to apply
Ortiz where trial court actually ruled on an unpreserved issue, albeit on a different ground
than that argued by the appellant).
*

*

*

While it is arguable whether trial counsel raised timely relevance objections to
evidence that he had attempted suicide and had also previously used mushrooms, the trial
court addressed these claims. Specifically, the prosecutor inquired, without objection, if Lisa
noticed "any aberrant behavior of [defendant]? R506:64. Lisa said "[t]here were several
times that he had tried to commit suicide. There were occasions where - - " Id. At which
point, trial counsel objected on relevance grounds. Id. The prosecutor responded that the
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"relevance is that the behavior and later statements made to the defendant led the witness to
believe that he was using controlled substances." R506:65. The trial court stated: "Let's keep
rolling." Id.
The prosecutor then asked Lisa "[w]hat else" she had observed? Id. As set forth
above, Lisa told, without objection, of finding defendant sleeping in the back room on one
occasion with a tourniquet and bent needles on the floor, and of observing defendant walk
into walls and have trouble with his dictation. Id. The prosecutor further inquired, without
objection, if Lisa was aware of defendant and Cindy "taking hallucinogenic mushrooms?"
R506:65. Lisa responded that "Cindy had told [her] that on one occasion." Id. Trial counsel
objected on hearsay grounds only after the prosecutor's follow-up question, "When was
that?" Id. The prosecutor explained that the evidence "provided the basis for why this matter
was brought to the attention of the DEA and why hallucinogenic mushrooms in particular
ever came up." R506:66. The trial court allowed it for that "limited purpose." Id. The
prosecutor then elicited that Lisa remembered
sitting at [her] desk, and Cindy said, we're going to be closed tomorrow, which
I believe was like on a Wednesday or something like that and she said that
they had some mushrooms, and they were going to take the day off and go do
mushrooms. I remember specifically because I swung around in my chair and
said, 'what?'
Id
Based on the above, the trial court arguably sustained defendant's relevancy objection
to evidence of his (defendant's) attempts at suicide. See R506:64-65. Indeed, the prosecutor
ceased questioning Lisa about defendant's suicide attempts. Id. Assuming the trial court
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sustained defendant's relevancy objection, trial counsel failed to ask the trial court to strike
the evidence, which would have cured any arguable prejudice here. See Mead, 2001 UT 58,
Tf 50 (holding that trial court's striking of testimony was "sufficient to dispel any prejudice
occasioned by the improper statement"). As defendant claims neither ineffective assistance
or plain error with regard to the failure to strike the evidence, such a claim is now
procedurally barred. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229.
On the other hand, if the trial court's ruling is fairly read to overrule defendant's
relevancy objection to evidence of his suicide attempts, defendant suffered no prejudice.
Even assuming the suicide evidence was erroneously admitted, given the weight of the
evidence against defendant, including his mishandling and misplacing of prescription drugs
at the clinic, see, e.g., R506:62-65, the discovery of drugs and mushrooms in his residence,
see R506:157,159, and his recorded statements describing his prior mushroom use (including
at the clinic), explaining that he was fired from the hospital for using drugs, offering to buy
psilocin mushrooms, and actually buying the mushrooms, the jury did not convict defendant
because he was also suicidal. R501:Exh. ## 7-8. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500
(Utah 1986) (erroneous limitation on cross-examination as to victim's possible motive in
testifying held non-prejudicial "because additional cross-examination would not have had
a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict").
As for defendant's complaint about evidence that he and Cindy had previously
ingested mushrooms, defendant fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's discretion
in ruling that this evidence was relevant and admissible for the "limited purpose"of
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demonstrating why defendant came to the DEA's attention in the first place and why he was
offered hallucinogenic mushrooms as opposed to another controlled substance. R506:65-66.
See State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, Tf 34, 44 P.3d 805. Indeed, this evidence was relevant to
refute defendant's defense of entrapment, or that he did not intend to consume the
mushrooms he was recorded offering to buy and then in fact purchased. See, e.g., R506:5158;R507:128-130, 137-141; R508:37, 42-47; R501:Exh. ## 7-8. See State v. Jaeger, 1999
UT 1, <H 13, 973 P.2d 404 (recognizing "because the standard for determining whether
evidence is relevant is so low, the issue of whether evidence is relevant is rarely an issue")Thus, defendant's complaint lacks merit and should therefore be rejected.
POINT V
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT RAISING A MIRANDA ISSUE WHERE
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING CITATION
TO THE RECORD; CONSEQUENTLY, HIS CLAIM IS
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
In Point V of his brief defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise a Miranda issue below.8 Aplt. Br. at 47-48. While defendant cites multiple Miranda
authorities, and even identifies factors to be considered in determining custody for Miranda
purposes, his brief wholly fails to identify where in the record a statement of defendant
obtained in alleged violation of Miranda was admitted at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 47-48, His
claim is therefore inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that ground.

l

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that the argument portion
of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
record relied on" (emphasis added). Under this rule, Utah appellate courts have consistently
declined to address inadequately briefed issues because "a reviewing court is entitled to have
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,
966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly
lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument").
Here, defendant's analysis is devoid of citation to the record, let alone record citation
to evidence of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda and admitted at trial. See Aplt.
Br. at 47-48. While defendant's Statement of Facts includes a paragraph with the heading:
Facts Relating to Miranda Violation, see Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing R502, Exh. #6 and R506:175183), the record citation therein fails to pinpoint the admission of a statement obtained in
alleged violation of Miranda and admitted at trial. First, R502:Exh. #6 is a part-trial
deposition of DEA agent Robert Johnson submitted as an exhibit with defendant's motion
for new trial. Even if the deposition supported defendant's blanket assertion of a Miranda
violation, it does not demonstrate where in the trial record the alleged statement was
admitted or that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to get the statement excluded.
Second, while R506:176-183 is a citation to the trial record, it is similarly unavailing because
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the citation is to an in camera discussion of the admissibility of defendant's volunteered
statements made post-Miranda. Thus, it similarly fails to demonstrate where in the trial
record the alleged statement was admitted, or that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
get the statement excluded.
Based on the above, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness appears to be speculative
and should therefore be rejected. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, U 17, 12 P.3d 92
("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively").
*

*

*

Even assuming defendant's brief is deemed adequate, trial counsel was not
ineffective. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must demonstrate
that defense counsel's representation was deficient and prejudicial. Parsons v. Barnes, 871
P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). This Court "need not address both components if a defendant
fails to meet his or her burden on either one." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah
1993). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 693, 697 (1984) ("If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed").
Defendant's fact statement arguably suggests his complaint is with the admission of
his statement to police that the could find the mushrooms in his kitchen. See Aplt. Br. at 17.
Johnson testified that defendant showed police where to find the mushrooms. See, e.g.,
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R506:157, 172. Assuming both that this is the evidence about which defendant complains,
and that it was obtained in violation of Miranda, it was hardly prejudicial.
The State's view is consistent with the trial court's rejection of defendant's new trial
motion. The trial court rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance because (1) "it
was not obvious that [defendant] was in custody at the time he was asked about the location
of the drugs," and (2) defendant suffered no prejudice "from admission of his pre-Miranda
statements." R482, add. E. The trial court's correct ruling should be upheld.
Regardless of whether defendant was in custody when he directed police to the
mushrooms, this evidence was not prejudicial. First, evidence that defendant assisted the
police to locate the mushrooms they had just overheard him purchasing was not inconsistent
with his defense of entrapment, or lack of intent to ingest the mushrooms. See, e.g.,
R506:51-58;R507:124-131,137-141;R505:35-47. Second, thejury already knew defendant
was recorded discussing his prior mushroom experiences, offering to buy any "extra"
mushrooms, and ultimately buying the mushrooms at issue here. See R501:Exh. ## 7-8.
Thus, thejury did not convict defendant solely because he told police where he had put the
mushrooms he just purchased. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986)
(erroneous limitation on cross-examination as to victim's possible motive in testifying held
non-prejudicial "because additional cross-examination would not have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict"). Because he cannot show prejudice here, see
R482, add. E, defendant cannot demonstrate ineffectiveness and his claim of such should be
rejected. Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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POINT VI
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL
In his last point, defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine applies here.
Aplt. Br. at 48. Under that doctrine, even if the alleged errors do not individually warrant
reversal, this Court will reverse if "'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines
[its] confidence that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1{ 44, 994 P.2d 177
(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah 1998)). For the reasons already argued,
defendant fails to show any error occurred; thus, the Court need not consider whether the
cumulative effect of these actions undermines confidence in the outcome. Id
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury convictions for possession of psilocin, hydrocodone and Demerol
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on / 2 . February 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that on /_2. February 2004, two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE were hand-delivered to the following:
JAMES C. BRADSHAW
ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO
BROWN BRADSHAW & MOFFAT
10 West Broadway, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
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Addendum A

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAJUD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

Criminal No.
SEARCH WARRANT

NATHANIEL PENN,
(CINDY DREW,
Defendant.
HE STATE OF UTAH TO AJNY ENFORCEMENT
STATE OF UTAH
I RAND,

OFFICER IN THE COUNTY' OF

Proof by affidavit was made "before me this day by
Investigator Rob Johnson that there is probable cause for
Issuance of an anticipatory search warrant, as more fully set
forth in the affidavit on file with the Court.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search
AT ANYTIME OF THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANNOUNCING
ENTRY, of: a single residence dwelling located at 300 East 300
South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, further described as a
ft white sided wtth green trim house, grey shingles, two doors
facing north, the

door to the east is a green screen door, the

door to the west is an aluminum screen door, red brick chimney on
east side of home, the numbers 300 are by the ease door, there is
1

993e£859et>

13*81 £9Q£/8G ^3

& driveway on the west

side with an aluminum hut over the

driveway.
To search for the following,

controlled substances,

including/ but not limited to, psilocybm mushrooms and/or
controlled substances
This search warrant is valid only upon the occurence of
the events described in the affidavit for this anticipatory
Search warrant.
If you find any of the property described above, or any
part thereof, bring it before me immediately at this court as
required by UCA 77-23-207.
You are authorized to execute this search warrant, AT
XNY TIME DURING THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANNOUNCING
^NTRY, of your authority and purpose
TIME:

Judge

L

)

$i- r >r SATE

v#

'»I,. .

a

2
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AFF DAVIT
UCA 7 7-23-1 et seq
STATE OF UTAH

)

bounty oC Grand

)

and UCA 53-37-10

) S3 .

The investigator undersigned, being duly sworn, states
on oath the following:
1.
OFFICER, Your affiant is Diversion Investigator
Rob Johnson of the Drug Enforcement Administration
Your affiant
is an investigator specifically assigned to investigate thfe
diversion of legally manufactured controlled substances m p o an
Illegal market. Your aJfiant has been an investigator m this
specific field for ibouu 13 years. Your affiant has been
involved in numerous investigations.
2.
PROPERTY. I request a search warrant to search a
Pmgle residence dwelling located at 300 East 300 South, Mpab,
Grand County, Utah, further described as a white sided with green
trim house, grey shingles, two doors facing north, the doot to
the east is a graen screen door, the door to the west is an
aluminum screen door, red brick chimney on east side of home, che
pumbers 300 are by the east door, there is a driveway on the west
side with an aluminum hut over the driveway. Said residence is
wichm a drug free zone.
Your affiant requests this search warrant to look for
the following; controlled substances, including, but not limited
to, psilocybin mushrooms and narcotics.
3.
LOCATION. I have probable cause to believe the
above described property may be located in the residence
described above.
4.
GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe there
pxists evidence of the crimes of Possession of a Controlled
Substance and/or Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance,
and within a drug free zone.

1
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5.

PROBABLE CAUSE and INFORMATION.

On January 21, 2002, CI gave a statement Co law
enforcement outlining Dr. Penn's improper use of his DEA license
ii prescribing narcotics. CI said when a prescription is filled
under a staff member's name, it is shared with Dr. Penn and, other
spaff. CI said narcotics are left out on Dr. Penn's shelf pr in
his desk drawer or filing cabinet. CI said Dr. Penn has seen
patients while he was under the influence of narcotics and to the
extent Chat staff members had to remind him of why he saw the
patients so he could dictate because he could not remember., CI
S£id pharmacies often call because prescriptions are wrong -or are
written for the wrong amounts or doses. CI said one patient had
mfed boxes in the office and the medications were gone before they
should have been, so to make up for the missing meds, Dr. Penn
called in a new prescription with an increase in dosage. 01 said
Dr. Penn sent out letters stating he would no longer prescribe
oxycontin, but yet he continued to prescribe oxycontin. CI said
a; patient brought in five Duragesic patches and four came up
missing. On January 30, 2002f CI said Cindy Drew told her [that
fcfrey were closing errly the next day because she and Dr. Penn
wjere going to do mushrooms. The DEA was contacted with this
information.
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence
described above as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, Utah,
and saw some multi-dose vials of Demerol in their refrigerator
01 also saw some .oxycontin m a prescription bottle, Labeled with
the name of Robert Silver, in the bathroom.
On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and CI went
tio the above described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew ibout
tihe side effects of using mushrooms. CI said CI' s brother'had
dome mushrooms that CI was considering trying. Penn and Direw
gave CI their opinion of how safe mushrooms were and said j^t was
good. They described how mushrooms would make CI feel which was
based on their past experience of using mushrooms. Penn then
4aid to CI It he stocked
any extra.,we' 11 buy it. Drew Chen said
tjhey got theirs from the northwest. Penn then said again, J If
he's got any extra,
I'll
buy some from him,
Penn then saitf,
enough for two of us.
Drew then said, Well, I'll
buy some, for
/pave too, cuz I owe Dav2 a favor and he wanted some.

2

Dr. Nathaniel Perm and Cindy Drew live together in the
4bove described residence and said residence is within a drug
ftree zone.
6
ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION
On April 20, 2002,
between 1000 and noon, DEA agents will meet with CI. CI azjid an
undercover agent (UC) will be searched and CI will be wire<£
CI
<3>r UC will be given som* psllocybin mushrooms. CI • s vehicle will
also be searched. CI and an undercover agent will drive ih CI s
Vehicle to the above described residence of Penn and Drew ^ith
the mushrooms
Agents will have CI and UC under visual and audio
observation at all times driving to and from said residence.
they will have CI and UC under audio observation while they are
\n the residence. It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash an£/or
controlled substance prescriptions
After CI and UC leave- the
residence, CI and UC and CI's vehicle will be re-searched '
Your affiant, is requesting this warrant be a no-knock^
warrant, to be served at any time of the night or day, for the
ireason your affiant firmly believes it is safer for police1
officers, participants and non-participants to the operation if
the officers have the safety of an unannounced entry
Further
there is an extremely high risk of the potential disposal and/or
concealment of drugs by the occupants prior to an announced entry
by the police.

DATE:

t-j/ri/clL

TIME:

l ^?/r>i
/

SIGNED N^^yr. " r f sm»
^
Irivelstigator Rob Johnson
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN co before me this

' '

day of

April, 2002.

Judge

'
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Addendum B

irtgory G. Skordas (#3865)
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS
& CASTON, L.L.C.
Suite 810 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885
Attorneys for Defendant

In the Seventh Judicial District Court
In and For Grand County, State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 021700103

NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,

Judge Lyle Anderson

Defendant.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Frederick Penn, by and through his attorney of record, Gregory
G. Skordas, hereby moves this court to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the anticipatory
search warrant. This motion is based on the reasons in the Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Suppress filed herewith.
DATED this S

day of

J^OC/^W

, 2002.
Gustin, Christian, Skordas & Caston, L.L.C.

Gr^biNfu. Skordas

Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS
& CASTON, L.L.C.
Suite 810 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885
Attorneys for Defendant

In the Seventh Judicial District Court
In and For Grand County, State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

v.
Case No. 021700103

NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,

Judge Lyle Anderson

Defendant.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Frederick Penn, by and through his attorney of record, Gregory
G. Skordas, hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress the
evidence seized pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant.
BACKGROUND
On January 21,2002, a confidential informant, ("CI") gave a statement to law
enforcement alleging that the Defendant was misusing his medical license by illegally
prescribing and misusing narcotics. The CI alleged that when a prescription was filled under a
staff member's name, it was shared with the Defendant and other staff. The CI further alleged
that the Defendant would treat patients while he was under the influence of narcotics. The CI

claimed to have observed vials of Demerol in the Defendant's refrigerator and some Oxycontin
in a prescription bottle, labeled with the name of Robert Silver in the bathroom of the
Defendant's home.
The CI was wired by agents and went to the Defendant's residence. While there, the CI
asked Defendant and co-defendant, Cynthia Drew, about the side effects of using mushrooms.
The CI stated that she had access to mushrooms and was considering trying them. The
Defendant and co-defendant allegedly told the CI of their experiences and the affects of
mushrooms and that they were willing to purchase some mushrooms if the CI's source had any
extra.
Based on this information, the police obtained an anticipatory search warrant (Attached
as Exhibit A). The affidavit included the aforementioned, as well as "Anticipatory Information"
contained in paragraph 6. The "Anticipatory Information" stated that the CI and DEA agent were
going to go to the Defendant's home and attempt to sell him mushrooms and would thereafter
have illegal substances in his possession.
The next day, the CI brought her source, an undercover DEA agent posing as CI's
brother, to the Defendant's home and introduced them. (See Transcript, attached as Exhibit A)
The undercover agent then told the Defendant that he "brought some." He shows the Defendant
what he brought, and said, "I don't have any that you're interested in?" The undercover agent
then offered to make a trade with the Defendant for "Lortabs or something," to which the
Defendant refused. The undercover agent finally ended up selling some mushrooms to the
Defendant.

2

The Defendant's home was subsequently searched pursuant to the search warrant. The
items seized included the mushrooms sold to the Defendant by the DEA agent, a prescription
bottle under the name of Robert Silver, a patient of the Defendant's, and a multi-dose bottle of
Demerol.
ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 14 of the
Utah State Constitution both delineate a person's right to be free from an unreasonable search or
seizure. Article 1, section 14 of the Utah State Constitution states that a people have the right "to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" and that "no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized." Therefore, there must be probable cause for a belief that
the item sought is in the place to be searched.
Utah's definition of "probable cause" is "a 4fair probability' that evidence of the crime
will be found in the place or places name in the warrant." State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,
1260 (Utah 1993). At the time the warrant was sought, there was no probable cause that the
Defendant had engaged in any wrongdoing or that there was evidence of any crime in the
residence. While the affidavit does include a statement that the CI observed Demerol and
Oxycotin in the Defendant's home, these items are not per se illegal and therefore an improper
basis for the search warrant.
There are two general requirements for a valid anticipatory search warrant: "(1) that it be
supported by probable cause and (2) that the warrant or supporting affidavit clearly set out
conditions precedent to the warrant's execution." United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194,
3

1201 (10th Cir. 1998). Probable cause to support anticipatory warrants in conditioned "on the
occurrence of certain expected or 'triggering' events, typically the future delivery, sale, or
purchase of contraband." Id. While assessing the probability that certain triggering events will
occur, "the magistrate must also evaluate the probability that, following the triggering events, the
evidence will be in the named place when the search warrant is executed." State v. Womack. 967
P.2d 536, 543 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998).
The magistrate must not "abandon the juristic role of assessing probable cause by
depending on police guarantees that the search will not be done unless there is probable cause."
Id. at 544. The police must show, on existing facts, that the evidence to be confiscated will be at
the named place when the search occurs. There must be a "trustworthy assurance" that the
contraband will "almost certainly" be located in the place described at the time of the search.
Rowland. 145 F.3d at 1202-03.
There was no such guarantee that the contraband described in the search warrant affidavit
would be at the Defendant's home. There was no more than mere speculation that the Defendant
would purchase the mushrooms from the DEA agent and therefore have them in his possession.1
There was not sufficient probable cause for the issuance of this warrant, thereby making it
invalid. Without a valid warrant supported by probable cause, the search is illegal and the fruits
of such must be suppressed.

'Paragraph 6 of the warrant affidavit states, "It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or controlled substance
prescriptions." There is no statement or assurance that the Defendant would purchase the
substance or that he would subsequently anything in his possession.
4

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should suppress the evidence seized in the Defendants
home pursuant to the invalid search warrant.
DATED this

S

day of S t p n ^ V

, 2002.

GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON

G. Skordas
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Addendum C

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

TRANSCRIPT OF
MOTION HEARING

-vs-

Nos.

NATHANIEL FREDERICK
PENN,

021700103 (Moab)
021700243 (Price)

Judge Lyle Anderson

Defendant.

Date:

October 30, 2002

Place

Price, Utah

FILED
I M h Court of Appeals

SEP 2 6 2003
Pauletta Stagy
Cterk of the Court

aoo*<***-d/\
GARCIA if LOVE
COURT REPORTING fl«0 VlQEOSHflPHV

36 South State Street • Suite 1220 • Salt Lake City, UT 8 4 1 1 1 • 801 538 2333 • Fax 801 538 2334

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

William L. Benge
Attorney at Law
94 East Grand Avenue
P.O. Box 699
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (43 5) 259-68 33

For the Defendant:

Gregory G. Skordas, Esq.
Skordas & Caston
9 Exchange Place, Suite 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444

E X H I B I T S
No.
1
2
3
4

Description
Transcript of audiotape
Transcript of audiotape
Transcript of audiotape
Audiotapes

Discussed
7
7
7
7

Received
8
8
8
8
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1

O c t o b e r 30,

2

2002

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Okay.

We're

4

sitting in chambers for Grand County in the case of

5

State of Utah v. Nathaniel Penn, 0217103.

6

Mr. Benge, for agreeing to come up here for this hearing

7

today.

8

you, but thank you for agreeing as well.

9

Thank you,

And, Mr. Skordas, it was less of a sacrifice for

As I understand it, we have a motion to sever,

10

a motion to suppress, a motion to change venue and a

11

notice of intent to raise the affirmative defense of

12

entrapment that need to be addressed today.

13

that all of them?

14

MR. BENGE:

Is that--is

Well, Your Honor, I think the

15

motion to sever is moot, as we settled the case

16

involving the co-defendant.

17

THE COURT:

I notice that Ms. Drew's case is

18

scheduled for change of plea on November 6th. And

19

assuming she does, then of course it will be moot.

20

MR. BENGE: And then, Your Honor, maybe to make

21

matters a little bit more swift, we, on behalf of the

22

State, are not resisting the motion for change of venue.

23

We concur in that motion and think that that would be

24

appropriate.

25

THE COURT:

Do you have any suggestions about

1

where we should send the case?

2

MR. BENGE:

Well, I don't think San Juan County

3

would be a whole lot better inasmuch as Dr. Penn has

4

practiced medicine there.

5

Emery, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

I would suggest Carbon or

Kind of where I would go.

7

Probably Carbon is easier.

8

you know about the availability of courtrooms here on

9

November 2 0th through the 22nd?

10

THE CLERK:

I don't suppose you have--

I could certainly check for you,

11

Judge.

12

arguments, but it looks like Judge Bryner's courtroom

13

would be available.

14

THE COURT:

How about the next two days after

THE CLERK:

Judge Bryner has hearings that day,

15
16
17

November 20th?

Judge Halliday has oral

that?

but Judge Halliday's courtroom here would be available.

18

THE COURT:

19

between courtrooms?

So we can bounce back and forth

20

THE CLERK

Uh-huh, at least the following day,

21

THE COURT

And then the next one, the 22nd?

22

THE CLERK

The 22nd?

It looks like we have

23 I

court in both courtrooms, but I do believe Judge

24

Johansen's courtroom would be available.

25

MR. SKORDAS:

Your Honor, could I interrupt

briefly?

I have a matter, and the judge in this other

case knows about my conflict, but a Judge in Summit
County has scheduled an in-custody rape trial for this
same week, starting November 20th, with the knowledge
that I had this trial previously set.

It was Judge

Hilder, now Judge Lubeck.
One way or the other, I'm going to have to
postpone or continue one of the two cases.

I certainly

have no problem putting this to the next week or
whatever.

Judges often, as you know, set knowing that

cases resolve, and that's, I think, what happened here.
I actually have three trials to begin on the 20th, but
one of them will not be a problem.
THE CLERK:

We have courtrooms available on the

26th and the 27th, as well as the 28th.
THE COURT:

During Thanksgiving.

THE CLERK: Oh.
THE COURT:

You know, the problem for me is if

we go--if we change from this date, we're going to be
looking at a new year, and several months in the future.
And so--if Judge Lubeck really wants--if he--if his case
has to go and my case has to go, I guess he's going to
have to call me and persuade me that I should reschedule
my previously-scheduled case because his case involves
someone in custody.

But I'm going to hold my ground
5

1

until he calls me and convinces me of that.

2

We'll have a courtroom one way or another for

3

this case up here, so I'll schedule it for Carbon

4

County.

5

on the stipulation.

6

Carbon County, unless you tell me we have an exhausted

7

jury pool.

8
9

I'll grant the motion for change of venue based

THE CLERK:

We'll have the case in--tried in

No, I have quite a big jury pool

that we can access, Judge.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

And I think--I think that

11

Carbon County owes Grand County one, because there was

12

that case that was tried up here twice, first time a

13

hung jury, second time couldn't get a jury.

14

time couldn't get a jury, second time barely got a jury,

15

had to declare a mistrial halfway through and eventually

16

tried it in Moab.

17
18

So it would be fair.

So we'll have it up here

on--

19
20

MR. BENGE:

So November 20th, 21st, 22nd, Your

Honor?

21

THE COURT: Yes.

22

MR. BENGE:

Same days?

23

THE COURT:

Same days.

MR. BENGE:

It's not an alibi.

24
25

No, first

Now, what about the

alibi?

MR. SKORDAS:

You mean the entrapment?

THE COURT: Entrapment.
MR. BENGE:

Your Honor, what we would propose

doing--first of all, I know Your Honor sat through the
preliminary hearing.

We would ask that the Court take

consideration of the preliminary hearing videotape
and/or transcript.

I think--well, the tape is a

transcript.
We would also offer both the transcription of
the audio recordings of the three different wired
transactions at the time that this confidential
informant went by the Penn/Drew house.
The first time, there's really nothing in that
one.

But the second time when she went by it talked

about the fact that her cousin or her brother-in-law was
coming into town and she was going to try mushrooms for
the first time, and during which time Mr. Penn asked if
she could get some for him.

And then the third tape and

transcription is of the actual purchase.
We would offer the three transcriptions and
also the background tape recordings of the same thing.
And with regard to the tape recordings, we have actually
two tape recordings of each transcript--of each
incident. As I understand them, one is a tape made from
the KELL unit that is in the patrol vehicle.

The other
7

1

is a tape made from the recording device that the CI had

2

on her person, or the officer had on his person.

3

that correct?

4

(No audible response.)

5

THE COURT:

Do you have any objection to me

6

receiving those in evidence, Mr. Skordas, for this

7

purpose?

8

MR. SKORDAS:

9

THE COURT: Yeah.

10

Is

Both the transcript and the tape?

MR. SKORDAS: No, I don't have any problem with

11

that.

12

transcript and had not reviewed the tape.

13

provided those today, so certainly given that the Court

14

may want to have both in hand at the same time when you

15

review that information.

16
17

We had some concerns about the--some of the

THE COURT:

Can they be listened to on a

regular tape recorder?

18

MR. BENGE:

19

THE COURT: All right.

20

Bill has

Yes, they--on a regular cassette.
I'll receive those.

Let'a §*t them marked.

21

THE CLERK:

Should we (inaudible).

22

MR. BENGE:

I don't--I think if you could do it

23
24
25

as just one (inaudible).

Thank you.

Offer Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, which are the
transcripts, Your Honor.
8

1
2

Offer Exhibit 4, which are the audiotapes. And
I received from the DEA Monday morning.

3
4

THE COURT: Now, you have other--these are just
copies, right?

5
6

MR. BENGE:

Yes. We have the ori--the DEA has

maintained the originals.

7

THE COURT: Now, I have a memorandum from

8

Mr. Skordas.

9

Mr. Benge?

Do you have anything you want to add,

10

MR. BENGE:

Yes, Your Honor, just briefly.

11

Your Honor, in response to this and perhaps to

12

give Your Honor an idea of where the State is coming

13

from in terms of what to listen for and read for, the

14

law is pretty clear on entrapment, that merely providing

15

a defendant an opportunity to commit a crime that he's

16

already predisposed to commit is not entrapment.

17

And we would point Your Honor to the second

18

transcript, the longest one, where the confidential

19

informant went and talked to Dr. Penn and Ms. Drew about

20

the story about her relative coming to town and she was

21

going to take mushrooms.

22

First of all, in that tape there is reference

23

to the fact that Dr. Penn has taken mushrooms before and

24

talks about how he was on mushrooms in the clinic one

25

day.

Then he goes on to state later in that

1

conversation, giving her detailed advice about how to

2

take the mushrooms and how--that she'll probably be

3

nauseated and not to worry about that.

4

safe and the fact that he takes mushrooms rather than

5

other drugs because they're not traceable by drug tests.

6

And that it's

And then in particular, toward the end of that

7

tape, he goes into detail and says--she says, "Yeah,

8

call me tomorrow and I'll tell you how it was."

9

Cindy says, "Check."

10

And

And the CI says, "My cousin comes

from Arizona, too, so I don't know."

11

Dr. Penn says, "If he stocked any extra, we'll

12

buy them."

13

locally, right?"

14

Dr. Penn again says, uIf he's got any extra, I'll buy

15

them from him."

16

And the CI says, "I mean, you guys get yours
Cindy Drew says, "From the northwest."

And, Your Honor, you listen to that--and that's

17

the day before the transaction.

18

the transcript from the day of the transaction, when the

19

buy actually went down.

20

certainly ask that you look at that also.

21

Mr. Skordas did include

It's part of his motion.

But here he is the day before, he's the one

22

setting up the buy.

23

completely emasculates entrapment argument.

24

it.

25

We'd

THE COURT:

Therefore, I think that just
We'd submit

I'm obviously going to have to read

10

1

these and listen to the tapes. There's no point in

2

taking them if I'm not. Do you have anything that you

3

want to add?

4
5

MR. SKORDAS:

I do, Your Honor.

And I'm not

sure how we can accomplish this.

6

I had filed a motion to sever because I felt

7

that the co-defendant's testimony could be helpful in

8

respect of this motion and, probably more importantly,

9

the next motion.

I spoke with her attorney about her

10

ability to testify and she has — she's scheduled for a

11

change of plea next week.

12

shielded, I guess, for lack of a better word, by her

13

Fifth Amendment privilege.

14

Therefore, she's still

I would like the opportunity to supplement the

15

record with her testimony after she enters her plea next

16

week, and would make myself available for a short

17

evidentiary hearing in that respect to do that.

18

believe that after she's entered her plea, I can call

19

her as a witness in both of these motions, and I intend

20

to do so.

But I

But I could not have done so today.

21

THE COURT:

Proffer what she would say.

22

MR. SKORDAS: With respect to the entrapment

23

issue, she could talk about the prior relationship with

24

the confidential informant, the number of times that the

25

two of them had been to the house, the nature of that
11

1
2

relationship.
And I think with respect to entrapment, there

3

is--that the nature of the relationship between the

4

person who entrapped and the defendants, if you will, is

5

important in determining whether or not they would do

6

something that they would not have otherwise done. That

7

is to say, if my--some close friend of mine begs me for

8

something or asks me for something or persuades me to do

9

something, I may be more willing to do that than I would

10

for someone who is a co-worker or something like that.

11

And so I think it's important to establish that

12

relationship.

13

THE COURT:

You're an officer of the court. I

14

trust that you won't tell me something that you clearly

15

know you can't prove.

16

what you hope that the witness would say.

17

hope the witness will say about the relationship?

18

You may--you may spin it some to

MR. SKORDAS:

What do you

That she's more than just a co-

19

worker, that she's a friend.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SKORDAS:

Okay.

Someone--

She's a confidante, that she's

22

someone who would visit their home that would befriend

23

them, that would talk to them, that they would do things

24

with, that was not just their office manager or

25

bookkeeper or-12

1
2

THE COURT:

More than a friend, even a close

friend?

3

MR. SKORDAS: Right.

4

THE COURT:

5

But not a sexual relationship,

intimate in t;hat way?

6

MR. SKORDAS: No. No. No.

7

THE COURT: All right.

8

MR. SKORDAS:

9

THE COURT:

That they had talked--

And would she say that there were

10

any pleas, ''Please, you have to help me because I need--

11

I need you to do this for me, I need you to buy this''?

12

MR. SKORDAS:

I don't believe so. Although

13

there's--I believe that there will be evidence that the

14

confidential informant's husband has had some problems

15

previously and that there was some dialogue between the

16

two of them about him. And--

17

MR. BENGE:

18

MR. SKORDAS:

Evidence of what kind?
Substance abuse, domestic

19

violence, and that they--there was a greater level of

20

confidence between the two of them because of that.

21
22

THE COURT: All right. And that's what you
might get from Ms. Drew?

23

(No audible response.)

24

THE COURT:

25

That's the only additional evidence

you'd want to present?
13

1

MR. SKORDAS: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

Well, all right.

I guess what I'll

3

have to do is listen to this, give a provisional ruling,

4

or if I think I can give a ruling based on accepting

5

your proffer as what her testimony would be, then I'll

6

(inaudible) that as well.

7
8
9
10

Are there any cases that either of you want me
to read that are not already in the memoranda?
MR. BENGE: No.
THE COURT:

All right.

How about the motion to

11

suppress, then?

12

that without any additional testimony as well.

13

Mr. Skordas?

14
15
16

I guess you were planning to present

MR. BENGE:

I think the defense has that

burden, inasmuch as there was a warrant (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Now, you have the--both the burden

17

of going forward on that and--and the burden of--I guess

18

there's a presumption of validity of the warrant.

19
20
21

MR. SKORDAS:

If there's a search warrant,

that's true, and there was in this case.
THE COURT: Okay.

Do you have anything to add

22

to your memorandum, Mr. Skordas, about the validity or

23

invalidity of the search warrant?

24
25

MR. SKORDAS: Not with respect to the
anticipatory nature of the search warrant, which was
14

1

really the crux of our argument on that.

2

Your Honor, again, this is something that I

3

would ask leave of the Court to bring in the testimony

4

of Cindy Drew on.

5

different issue than what was raised in our--our motion;

6

that is, that the underlying facts that were relied on

7

by the police officer were the result of an illegal

8

search and seizure by the confidential informant who, at

9

the time, was a confidential--was an agent of the

10
11

And this would be a somewhat

police.
I believe Cindy Drew would have--could testify

12

that in order for this confidential informant to have

13

seen what she saw, she would have gone into areas of the

14

home that she was not entitled to go into as a guest or

15

friend or whatever she was, the bathroom--the bathroom

16

medicine chest.

17

I think that the confidential informant

18

testified that she had gone into these things prior to

19

the time the search warrant was issued.

20

the bathroom medicine chest and saw, about two weeks

21

prior to the time the warrant was issued, some

22

Hydrocodone or oxycodone, whatever it is, in a

23

prescription bottle in the name of another person.

24

the police officers relied on that in obtaining their

25

search warrant at the time when the confidential

She looked in

And

15

1

informant was an agent of the police.

2

I believe Ms. Drew will testify that she should

3

not have been in the area of the house at that time and

4

going through the medicine cabinet, and such that would

5

have been an illegal search by someone who was at the

6

time an agent of the police.

7

THE COURT:

8

I see.

I wonder if you'll forgive

me for coming back to the--

9

MR. SKORDAS:

10

THE COURT:

Entrapment?

--entrapment question, because

11

what--something Mr. Benge said raised a question in my

12

mind that I'd like to resolve at this stage, if

13

possible.

14

Utah law says that the--the statutory law says

15

that it's an objective test for entrapment, that it

16

doesn't really matter what previous propensity the

17

defendant had, that it's--that the police conduct is

18

measured against a standard that really is--ought to be

19

the same no matter who they're dealing with. And

20

there's been a little--and when it comes to instructing

21

the jury about what it is they're supposed to do,

22

there's been a little back and forth on that in the

23

decided opinions, and maybe some between the Court of

24

Appeals and the Supreme Court.

25

And then I think I also remember several years
16

1

ago the-U.S. Supreme Court in a child porn case said

2

that the government had to prove a propensity--it was an

3

unusual case where the defendant was saying you have to

4

prove a propensity first.

5

What I'm wondering, Mr. Skordas, is is it your

6

view that the State does have to prove a propensity or

7

is it your view in this case that the State does not--

8

can't prove--not only doesn't have to prove a propensity

9

but cannot be permitted to do so?

10

MR. SKORDAS:

I'm trying to read the entrapment

11

statute as you're speaking, and I'm not sure that I have

12

a very knowledgeable answer for that.

13

I guess I have never assumed that the State had

14

to prove that the defendant had a propensity to commit

15

the crime prior to the time they engaged him or her in

16

their investigation.

17

THE COURT:

Well, that's what I understand Utah

18

law is saying.

There's this federal issue having over--

19

I don't want--in your case it probably hurt your client

20

to have the State prove propensity.

21

don't know what they would have.

I don't know--I

22

MR. SKORDAS: Right.

23

THE COURT: Assuming they may get in more bad

24

acts, if you say they have to prove propensity.

But it

25

certainly is required--in fact, it's not even written
17

1

under state law.

But if federal law requires it, it

2

probably trumps state law if you assert it.

3

giving you an opportunity to assert that the federal law

4

does trump state law and you want the State to prove

5

propensity.

6

think about that.

Maybe you want to take some time for you to

7

MR. SKORDAS:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

So I'm just

Thank you.

Take some time before you tell me.

Unless you tell me that, I'm just going to go under
state law.

11

MR. SKORDAS:

12

MR. BENGE:

I understand.
I guess my response, Your Honor, is

13

I feel that if either--in either case, for the purpose

14

of this hearing, that the transcripts speak for

15

themselves and would show the lack of entrapment, either

16

under state or federal standard, if that is the current

17

federal standard.

18

THE COURT:

All right.

Back to the motion to

19

suppress.

20

up on what Mr. Skordas is saying, that the State had a

21

confidential informant who was working for the State as

22

an agent at the time some two weeks before the buy when

23

she was in the house, she would have been snooping

24

around in places she did not have permission to be.

25

I think I've got--I think I have now picked

MR. BENGE:

Well, Your Honor, she did see the

18

1

one drug in the medicine cabinet.

The other drug, I

2

believe, was in the refrigerator.

I guess I would throw

3

back the fact that as counsel contends that they were

4

such good friends, perhaps she had a right to be

5

everywhere in that house.

6

Other than that, Your Honor, I believe that

7

this is a pretty strong burden to overthrow a valid

8

search warrant issued by a sitting judge.

9

absent some indication that this is perjured testimony,

10

the anticipatory nature is what Mr. Skordas went into in

11

his motion.

12

truth.

13

would like to cross-examine him on the perjury aspect of

14

it. And the anticipatory information came true. We'd

15

submit it.

16

And I think

And I believe that it, number one, was

And Investigator Johnson is here, if Mr. Skordas

THE COURT:

Let me just ask you about--about

17

the medicine cabinet and refrigerator.

So it's your

18

position that as good a friend as that, they let her

19

into their home, and they have no reasonable expectation

20

that she's not going to open the refrigerator, she's not

21

going to open the medicine cabinet?

Is that the idea?

22

MR. BENGE:

Yes, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

There's not a reasonable

24

expectation of privacy with someone that you're that

25

good a friend with and you invite into your home?
19

1

MR. BENGE:

That would be our position.

2

THE COURT:

You're not going to be saying that

3

she would never have permission to go to the--into a

4

rest room--into the restroom in this home?

5

MR. SKORDAS:

I would say that Cindy Drew, the

6

co-defendant, will testify that at the time Lisa LePlant

7

went into the home and searched the medicine cabinet and

8

the refrigerator, she was not an invitee of the home and

9

that both of the co-defendants were not present in the

10

home.

She would testify that they were not there, nor

11

was she given permission to enter the home.

12

I believe that her testimony would be--

13

THE COURT:

So even though you may let your

14

neighbor--your friend come to your house then you may

15

say--they go into your rest room or may go in your

16

refrigerator, that doesn't mean they can come in when

17

you're not there and do that?

18

MR. SKORDAS:

Right.

I believe that her

19

testimony would be, Your Honor, if I could make a

20

proffer again--you've been very generous in that respect

21

--that Nat and Cindy were out of town, that they had

22

asked her to feed their cat during that time through a

23

door that didn't require her to come into the house, and

24

that she nonetheless entered the house and looked in the

25

refrigerator and looked into the medicine cabinet.
.

20

1
2

THE COURT:

Do you have some proffer on that,

Mr. Benge?

3

MR. BENGE:

Yes, Your Honor.

First of all, I

4

was reminded in talking to Mr. Johnson, who is the

5

affiant of the--on the search warrant, that the

6

confidential informant had seen the prescription bottle

7

and the Demerol in their house prior to the point that

8

she became an agent for the DEA.

9

She later--after she became an agent for the

10

DEA, she saw the same items again.

11

point out, Your Honor--

12
13

THE COURT:

Secondly, I would

Did she do it on an occasion when

she was feeding one of their animals or (inaudible).

14

MR. BENGE:

I can't remember.

15

Secondly, I would point out that in the

16

probable cause statement it just says that she saw the

17

prescription bottle in the bathroom.

18

medicine cabinet.

19

specific than that when she made the search warrant.

20

But I think the search warrant speaks for itself on

21

that.

22

if she was in there feeding her cat, she would have had

23

the use of the bathroom.

24

would have the use of the bathroom.

25

She didn't say the

I cannot recall if she was more

It just says uin the bathroom."

She certainly--

If she's there visiting, she

THE COURT: Well, it sounds to me like we
21

actually have some factual issues about what happened
here.

But you don't have the informant here to testify?
MR. BENGE:

I didn't bring her.

I didn't

realize that that was going to be an issue today.
THE COURT:

It isn't necessarily signaled by

the memorandum.
MR. BENGE:

But I could--if you wish to take

her testimony, I could certainly get her--make her
available.
MR. SKORDAS: Are you looking at the affidavit,
Your Honor?

The affidavit simply states "approximately

two weeks ago"--and the affidavit is dated the 19th, so
I'm assuming that would have been on about the 4th or
5th of April 2002--"the CI was in the residence
described as Third East and Third South and saw some
multi-dose vials of Demerol in their refrigerator.

She

also saw some Oxycodone in a prescription bottle labeled
with the name of Robert Silver in the bathroom."

That

was the time period that we-THE COURT:

Well, so you would--what you're

asking me on this--on this ground at least here, the
ground of the reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated on that two-week ago period, what you would
like me to do is strike that paragraph from the
affidavit and then evaluate the affidavit as to whether
22

it has probable cause?
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

Is that right?
Well--I don't know.

Yeah, I don't--I'm not, you know--

MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

You catch me off guard.
--entitled to throw the whole thing

out just because there's part of it that's inadmissible,
am I?
MR. SKORDAS: No. No.

I guess you could look

at the search warrant and strike language that's
problematic.

We still haven't dealt with the

anticipatory nature of the search warrant.
THE COURT:

Well, let's deal with that then.

Because I think even if we strike that paragraph about
what happened two weeks earlier, that we still have
ample probable cause here for the issuance of the
warrant, unless something about the anticipatory nature
of it rings a bell with me.

So tell me why the

anticipatory nature makes it invalid.
MR. SKORDAS:

I guess I would just refer the

Court--you apparently have reviewed my memorandum.
Anticipatory search warrants, by their nature, take the
probable cause determination away from a judge and place
it in the hands of law enforcement.
And I suppose Bill could argue correctly that
the anticipatory event actually occurred, and so the
23

officers are then justified in making the final
determination, which I believe the Fourth Amendment
requires you to make in deciding whether or not they
could go into the house and execute the search warrant.
It would have been very easy, Your Honor, and
it would not have delayed this matter, had the police
officers waited until that event and then approached the
Court and gone into the house and got the search warrant
and said, She's gone in the house, we searched her
before and after.
have them now.

She had mushrooms before, she doesn't

She was wired, whatever, and so we

believe there's going to be mushrooms in the house.
But instead, they say, Trust us, Judge, and
we're going to send her in there and when she comes out
she probably won't have mushrooms and therefore you
ought to give us the green light to go ahead and search,
but we'll make that determination ultimately.

And what

we'd like to do-THE COURT:

The test does impose the condition

on the validity of the warrant that-MR. SKORDAS: Right.
THE COURT:

--those things have to actually

occur,
MR. SKORDAS:
officers.

Right, in the mind of the police

But the Fourth Amendment requires the officer
24

1

to swear that they did occur and, in my opinion, Your

2

Honor, when you issued that search warrant, not cross

3

our hearts we think they'll occur, and if they do, can

4

we go ahead and do this.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SKORDAS:

7
8
9

Is there case law on this?
Only what I've cited that we

could find, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I mean, is there case law that says

absolutely no anticipatory warrants in Utah?

10

MR. SKORDAS: No, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

Is there a case that says, yes,

12

sometimes anticipatory warrants are okay in Utah, or has

13

it not been addressed yet?

14

MR. SKORDAS:

I believe that the case--that the

15

nature of that has not been addressed very well for us,

16

Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Benge, are there cases in Utah

18

whether an anticipatory search--apparently the statute

19

contemplates it.

20

MR. BENGE:

Yes, Your Honor.

I'm not aware of

21

the case law.

The statute does contemplate it, and I

22

think that that's the safeguard, is that the warrant

23

says--I mean, if this deal didn't go down and the sale

24

of the mushrooms didn't occur, then our search warrant

25

wouldn't have been valid.
25

1
2

THE COURT:
officers.

And you're just trusting the

Are there cases from other jurisdictions?

3

MR. BENGE:

I (inaudible).

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Skordas, are there cases from

5

other jurisdictions that say absolutely no anticipatory

6

warrants here?

7

MR. SKORDAS: No, I don't believe so.

8

THE COURT:

9

Are there cases in other

jurisdictions that you know of that say, Yeah,

10

anticipatory warrants are okay?

11

looked at the question?

12
13
14

MR. SKORDAS:

Or have you not really

I haven't, but I would be happy

to do so in short order.
THE COURT:

Well, Ifm--I kind of need to make a

15

decision now.

16

now and the trial and, theoretically, some opportunity

17

to change after trial.

18

I suppose I can always change it between

MR. SKORDAS:

I think we could do all that

19

without bumping the trial or moving it.

We could even

20

have a ahort evidentiary hearing the morning of trial

21

and h&vji the jury come at noon or whatever.

22

to make it easy on everybody.

23

THE COURT:

Ifm trying

Well, at this point I don't--I have

24

not been convinced that the anticipatory nature of the

25

warrant renders it invalid.

It seems like a reasonable
26
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Utah, on telephonic warrants where somebody screwed up
trying to do that.

And it is so easy to screw up on a

telephonic warrant that I--I shiver at the thought that
someone would call me up and want to do a telephonic
warrant, because-MR. BENGE:

I've tried to avoid it.

THE COURT:

--it's a logistical nightmare. And

the only careful way, and I think the sane way to do
telephonic warrants, is simply to do them the same as
regular warrants and just read the affidavit over the
telephone.

But today, you might as well fax it, which

is what we have done in some cases.
The risk from having a telephonic conversation
between a judge and an affidavit where additional
information may be provided is not reflected in the
affidavit, it's just that we're not recorded, it's just
too gray.

And so I think not only is anticipatory

permissible under these circumstances, it really ought
to be preferred.
I won't have the last say on that, but for what
it's worth, from my practical experience with warrants,
the police ought to be encouraged to do it under these
circumstances.

It creates — it eliminates the--the

concerns that arise with the passage of time between
when events are observed and when the warrant can be
28
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were directed immediately to the mushrooms, which were
really, at that point, the only focus of the warrant
that's left.
THE COURT:

You want an opportunity to argue

that point or to present evidence on it?
MR. SKORDAS:

I guess I just argued it, but to

present evidence on--I didn't argue it very well, but I
would like to present evidence on that as well, and then
that would strike part of the warrant.
THE COURT:

I think the warrant would--once

there's probable cause to believe that there is some in
the house, I think they're entitled to look everywhere
in the house.

I think that's pretty well established.

So having considered that argument, and even if
I--if you had the opportunity to present that evidence,
it would not change my ruling with respect to the
evidence that was eventually seized.
I think you probably don't entertain much doubt
about how I'm going to rule on the motion to dismiss on
the entrapment grounds.

But I think I have an

obligation to read these things and listen to the tapes.
And so I will--I will do that before ruling on the
ent rapment i s sue.
On the entrapment question, the way I--the way
I understand that--and, Mr. Skordas, you can tell me if
30
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1

to just go ahead and have the trial and make a record

2

during the trial or as an aside during the trial,

3

without the jury there, on these things?

4

pretty full between now and November 2 0th.

5

MR. BENGE:

Mine is too.

My calendar is

I have--I was just

6

looking because I know I have prelims in Moab, but

7

they're on the 26th so that doesn't help us at all. I

8

guess we could just do it the morning of the trial.

9

THE COURT:

Well, okay.

Let's not schedule any

10

other hearings, but I'll give you a chance to make a

11

record on these statements without it counting against

12

you that it's actually after the trial's started.

13

And I'll try to get a ruling out to you by the

14

end of this week or the first of next week on the

15

entrapment question,

16

MR. BENGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

We'll be in recess.

18 I

(The hearing was concluded.)
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State of Utah v. Nathaniel Penn
October 30, 2002 hearing
Description

Page/Line

# Words

8:21

3-4

couldn't hear her

8:23

1-2

couldn't hear him

14:6

1-2

mumbled

14:15

1

couldn't understand him

21:13

1-2

mumbled

26:3

1-2

couldn't hear him

Addendum II

JAMES C. BR ADSHAW (#3768)
BROWN, BRADSIIAW & MOFFAT, I I P.

10 West Broadway, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-5297
Facsimile: (801) 532-5298
Attorneys for Defendant
i

I I I i »i M i l HI'hi! 1 -ill i us I K n 11 n i ni, ,Ki at i n i1 MI mi, I I ' ni

IN \ N P FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Pm mi i IT,

I 11 IN I"i IH V'V> I PI U-

v.
. *3

NATHA 1 1EI PR EDERI< :K PE ! J I
Defendant.
The defendant, I ' J art write! Penn, by and thi ough his uttoi ncy < f • ccord, hei cby move* this
Coan, pursuant to U.R Cr.P Rule 24. for an oi der granting a new" trial in this .matter, Sentencing
was held on Janua™-

il)03 and this motion Is tin icly filed uncila: U R.Ci IE , Rule 24^c), .

Said motion is made or. the grounds that the interests of justice require a, new trial The
grounds for the grant of a new trial, include, but are not limited to: erroneous jury instructions
that prejudiced the outcome of the trial and directed the jury to find juilt upon something other
than • easonable doubt; and the facial invalidity ' of the anticipatory search wauaui aul hoi ized i n
this case

Del endant additionally asserts that at the tin tc of the fillliiii ig ;: 1: this i i ration, counsel has
requested but not yet received transcripts necessary to this motion. ( "ounsc! herein did not
represent the defendant at trial, has recently been i etained. ai id therefore needs time to obtain

and review the trial transcript and other i.ecc^my iiilurrndiion to present in support of tins
motion. As such, Defendant reserves the right to amend and/or supplement the grounds
justifying a new trial upon receipt and review of the necessary information.
Finally, the Defendant requests a hearing in this matter at which time he can present
testimony and evidence to support this motion.

DATED this

1 IMV
L\

day of January 2003.

/AMES C. BRADSHAW
/Attorney for Defendant

T hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion tor iNew Trial was
mailed, postage prepaid, to Happy Morgan, Grand County Attorney, 125 F. Center St., Moab,
Utah, 84532, on the Z \ ^ day of January 2003.

< iflAUftl&A.
AVfG\K5S8

2

^MAAO/f.

\M!-SC BRADSHAW(#3768)
V.tr^iey for Defendant
BROWN, BRADSHAW & MOFFAI .

10 West Broadway, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-5297
Facsimile: (801)532-5298 '

< ' - \ ' p -• -

" ' v . DISTRICT COURT

\ WDVOR (iRAM)i'Oi \ IT. ST \TE OF UTAH
STXTEOFl'TAH,

iviw i IWIN i OR NEW TRIAL
v

-

NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,

.

Case V. ._. . ;Z43
(Judge t \ •* '•>i ;-irson)

Defendant.
Defendant, through counsel, hereby submits this memorandum in support ^ h - , n\owc-,
for new trial.
INTRODUCTION
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) states,
1 he court may, upon motion of a party ^ * *p
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of JL^
_.
is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon therightsof a party.
I t R Cum F. JJu).

.

' •

•:

Herein, the defendant alleges that there were errors or impropneties in the trial r this
matter that had a substantial adverse effect upon his nghts. The first prejudicial error centered
a

oi a

controlled substance. These instructions erroneously instructed the jury that it was proper to fu id

a simple finding that there may have been improper record keeping Further, and just as
importantly, there was no instruction that such a finding of "improper record keeping" had to be
made beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Second error that prejudiced Mr Penn's right to a fair trial in this matter centers
around the anticipatory warrant that was authorized in this case The Warrant was not supported
by probable cause, nor was the warrant validly executed, and as such, the motion to suppress
filed in this case should have been granted, and all evidence seized as a result of the warrant
should have been suppressed.
These errors, whether examined individually or cumulatively, prejudiced the defendant
and the sole remedy is the granting of a new trial.
Additionally, at the filing of this motion and memorandum, the Defendant has yet to
receive the requested transcripts and other supporting documents necessary for full review As
such, the Defendant reserves the right to supplement and/or amend his claims in support of this
motion for new trial
RELEVANT FACTS
General Background Information
1.

On April 29, 2002, the Defendant was charged by Information with three Second

Degree Felony counts of Unlawful Possession of A Controlled Substance in A Drug Free Zone,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. Count I charged the illegal possession of psilocybin,
Count II charged the illegal possession of hydrocodone, and Count II charged the illegal
possession of demerol.
2.

Prior to trial, the defendant, through his trial counsel, Greg Skordas, filed a

Motion to Suppress In his supporting memorandum, the defendant argued 1) that at the time the

2

warrant was sought, and based on the allegations of the CI, there was no probable cause that the
Defendant had engaged in any wrongdoing or that there was evidence of any crime at the
residence; an i 2) til: lat 1:1: ie anti- :ipatory search warrant was invalid because the " i n g u e r ^ g events
did not guarantee that the contraband described in the search warrant affidavit wouia r^ it the
De feudal ill

llnniii

M I f1 lb mm iiiiiliiiiiii in iii|i|inil nl mnlimi In Suppress .il ' -I i m-

concerning allegations that the triggering events did not occur, that the no-knock and night time
execution was improper, ot t:l ie absei ice of i: eliability ai id ; ei acitj ' it lfoi i: i latioi 1 ::>( 1:1: ie CI ii 11! i *
affidavit in support of the warrant: were not mentioned in the written, memorandum, and
seemingly did not serve as bases for the motion to suppress. 1
J.

In dealing w ith the motion to suppress, the Court did not consider 'he i - u e s

concerning the CI, but instead found, without hearing testimony or argument, tl: lat the remainder
o

^ v r ^ r was sufficient. 2 As such, the Court denied

•

the :etenUant s M-'.o't to ^up:-rcvN
4.
found Mr. Penn guilty of all three counts.
. 5.
granted the defendant the privilege of probation for a term ot ; o months, including sentencing
the defendant to serve 1 .v,- ua>„ .., ::,e u r a n a ^ .
6.

Pursuam •

K ... _ 4 4 4 i.

~ .

I Jefendant herein moves this court to order a

new trial 'based on prejudicial error c m-1%,; j u ; i i , b :;;^ '».«. -

a*Mj

Such m i
- "he r^i'"

i incited

-

,.;.; case.

stance of counsel, ai id Defendai it

• 2 Facts concerning the Court's ruling will be more fully detailed in supplemental
memorandum once the defendant has received and reviewed the transcripts.
3

Facts Relevant to the Jury Instructions Given at Trial
7.

At Trial, the Court gave the following Instructions with regard to the possession

elements:
a.

Instruction No, 3 states the following:

In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as
follows:
COUNT I:
1.
2.
3.
4.
COUNT II:
1.
2.
3.
4.

COUNT III:
i.
2.
3.
4.

b.

POSSESSION OF PSILOCIN IN A DRUG FREE
ZONE
That on or about April 20, 2002,
Defendant possessed psilocin,
In a drug free zone, and
Knowing what it was and intending to possess it.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE
That on or about April 20, 2002,
Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed
hydrocodone,
In a drug free zone, and
Without a prescription or otherwise complying with
the law.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEMEROL IN A
DRUG FREE ZONE
That on or about April 20, 2002,
Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed
Demerol,
In a drug free zone, and
Without a prescription or otherwise complying with
the law.

Instruction No. 6 states the following:

Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must still
obtain a prescription for any controlled substance for personal use.
Physicians licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances
are also permitted to possess reasonable quantities of controlled
substances for dispensing or administering to patients, but they are
required to keep a record of controlled substances received for that
purpose and dispensed or administered by them as physicians. A
4

physician who fails to comply with this requirement possesses those
substances illegally

j

I aii its Rele rai it il: o tl le "' i itl :ip at :: 11: 3 ' Seai ell 1 ' * 'ai i: ai it
8.

On April 19, 2002, Investigator Rob Johnson (" Johnson") 'from the DEA sought

and received an anticipatory search warrant to search tl le residence located at 300 East 300
south, in Moab, Utah.4
0

In support of the warrant, Johnson ^ujin.v^vi a sworn afiivjav \i ,w., - a

n

e

issi les presented herein, P a r a g r a p h 3 of the section entitled "Probable Cause and information1,1
describes a small portion of a wired conversation between a CI, Mr. Penn, and Ms. Cindy Drew
"agrapli id 1 Hi 11!11 nihil Inllins ini> illn» iliuns:
On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and CI went to the
above described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew about the side
effects of using mushrooms. CI said C F s brother had some
mushrooms that CI was considering trying. Penn and Drew gave
CI their opinion of how safe mushrooms were and said it was
good. They described how mushrooms would make CI feel wrhich
based on their past experience of using mushrooms. Penn then
^ r I if he stocked any extra we 11 buy it. Drew then said they
* from the northwest. Penn then said again, if he's got any
extra, 17/ buy some from him. Penn then said, enough for two of
us, Drew then said, Well, I'll buy some for Dave too, cuz I ow e
Da 'e a favor and, he wanted some.
Dr. Nathaniel Penn and Cindy Drew live together in the above
described residence and said residence is v\ ithin a drug free zone.
1

-d -tateb.

On Apni JU. 1W1. Detween ^ H and noon, m- A agent* will meet
3

Ai this point, counsel herein has not yet received the requested trial transcript \ s su^n,
it is i\ this time unknown whether trial counsel objected to Instruction \ o 6 and r proposed A
diffe m i n s t r u c t ». V ^^cr rhne ma* ^e a ^ ^ i d ^ '«•: r e f t e ^ i i ^ assistance claims • *!vs
point
4

A copy of the "Affidav it" in support, of the anticipatory warrant is attached as "Exhibit
A " \ copy of the "Search Warrant" is attached as "Exhibit B ''
5

with CI CI and an undercover agent (UC) will be searched and CI
will be wired. CI or UC will be given some psilocybm mushroom.
CFs vehicle will also be searched CI and an undercover agent will
drive in CI's vehicle to the above described residence of Penn and
Drew with the mushrooms Agents will have CI and UC under
visual and audio observation at all times driving to and from said
residence, they will have CI and UC under audio observation while
they are in the residence. It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or
controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC leave the
residence, CI and UC and CFs vehicle will be researched.

11.

Based on the information in the affidavit, officers obtained a warrant

12.

The warrant allowed an unannounced search of the residence any time day or

night, to search for "controlled substances, including, but not limited to, psilocybm mushrooms
and/or controlled substances."
13.

Finally, the Warrant stated that:
This search warrant is valid only upon the occurrence of the events
described in the affidavit for this anticipatory search warrant.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS, DENIED
THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, AND REQUIRE THE
GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER.
Because the Instructions to the jury were erroneous, misstated the law, and effectively

allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of the "unlawful possession of a controlled
substance" upon something other than reasonable doubt, the Defendant's due process rights were
violated and a new trial is warranted. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
As noted above, the Defendant was found guilty of three counts of "unlawful possession
of a controlled substance," in violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-37-8. The specific provision
under which the defendant was charged states that it is unlawful:

6

For any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter...
Utah Code. Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
A physician, however, is one of those specifically authorized pursuant to Chapter 37, to
possess controlled substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(2)(b).
The Court, in Instruction No. 3, instructed the jury that an individual is guilty of the
specific crime of "unlawful possession" when the individual possesses a controlled substance
"without a prescription or otherwise complying with the law." Instruction No. 3 also explained
to the jury that such element had to be found "beyond a reasonable doubt." However, there was
no instruction clarifying what "otherwise complying with the law means." Without
definition, such a phrase could be used by a jury to find guilt of "unlawful possession" based
upon a violation of any provision, no matter how minor. Such instruction, therefore,
misinstructs the jury since a violation of Chapter 37 is not necessarily the felonious crime of
"unlawful possession."
Further, the closest clarification as to what "otherwise complying with the law" means
was found in Instruction No. 6. Therein, the Court instructed the jury that physicians are
required to keep a record of controlled substances received for the purpose of administering as a
physician, and that a "physician who fails to comply with this requirement possesses those
substances illegally "(emphasis and italics added). Here, the Court erroneously equated a failure
to keep adequate records to the felony offense of "unlawful possession,"effectively creating a
new crime.
Overall, Instruction No. 6 fails in the following particulars: 1) The instruction misstates
the elements of "unlawful possession" of a controlled substance as contemplated by § 58-377

8(2)(a)(i); 2) The instruction gives no guidance as to what the required elements of the Court's
newly created "record keeping offense" are; and 3) the instruction effectively allowed the jury to
find guilt under something other than the requisite reasonable doubt standard.
First, as noted previously, Instruction No. 6 equates improper record keeping with the
criminal statutory crime of "unlawful possession of a controlled substance." This is simply not
true. While the failure to keep appropriate records may be improper, unethical, unprofessional,
and while such failure could amount to possible civil and administrative liability, a failure to
"knowingly" keep proper records alone is, at most, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(5) (providing that any violation of Chapter 37 for which no penalty has been
delineated, is a Class B misdemeanor). However, the Court's instructions improperly converted a
misdemeanor violation into a second degree felony. Such a result is contrary to the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature. To hold as such would mean that any time a clerical error is
made, a doctor may be found guilty of the felony. Simply put, a doctor does not become a
felon simply because he does not keep proper records.
Second, the jury was given no guidance as to what the record-keeping requirements were.
Although the jury was clearly told that a physician who does not keep records properly is
possessing drugs illegally, the jury was given absolutely no guidance as to what records were
required and under what circumstances the law was violated.
Third, the jury was also never instructed as to the mental state required relative to the
record keeping violation. In other words, the jury was never guided as to whether the Defendant
had to be the one who had failed in the record keeping duties, or whether he was also criminally
responsible for a dereliction in record keeping duties on the part of his staff.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the jury was never told that the failure to keep

8

the appropriate records, which had effectively become an element of the offense, had to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, the prosecution was improperly relieved of it
burden to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt See e g, State v
Hererra, 895 P 2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("For defendants to be convicted, due process mandates
that the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt),Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501(1) (defendant in criminal proceeding presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and in absence of such proot,
the defendant shall be acquitted).
In sum, this Court improperly instructed the jury that failure to keep proper records
automatically amounted to "illegal possession " The instructions were plainly erroneous, denied
the defendant his right to a fair trial, and require the granting of a new trial in this matter

II.

THE ANTICIPATORY WARRANT ISSUED IN THIS CASE
WAS INVALID,
A.

The General Requirements of All Anticipatory Warrants

In this case, investigators sought and received an "anticipatory" search warrant.
"Anticipatory search warrants are peculiar to property in transit." State v Womack, 967 P 2d
536, 539 (Utah 1998) (citing United States v Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1425 (7th Cir. 1996), cert
denied, 520 U.S. 1169 (1997)). These types of search warrants are "based upon an affidavit
showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime
will be located at a specified place." Womack, 967 P 2d at 539 (citing 2 Wayne H. LaFave,
Search and Seizure §§ 3.7(c), at 362 (3d ed. 1996)).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that anticipatory search warrants are not per se

9

unconstitutional under the federal constitution.5 Womack, 967 P.2d at 539-40. However, two
general requirements for a valid anticipatory warrant must be met: "(I) that it be supported by
probable cause; and (2) that the warrant or supporting affidavit clearly set out conditions
precedent to the warrant's execution." Id. at 543 (citing United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d
1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998)).
J*

Probable Cause

"In examining the validity of an anticipatory warrant, the probable cause analysis differs
most from the analysis of a traditional search warrant." See Validity of Anticipatory Search
Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b (2002). "Anticipatory warrants differ from
traditional search warrants in that at the time of issuance they are not supported by probable
cause to believe that contraband is currently located at the place to be searched." Womack 967
P.2d at 543 (citing Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1201). "As with other search warrants, however,
anticipatory warrants must be supported by probable cause." Id. As such, "[b]efore issuing an
anticipatory warrant the magistrate must determine, based on the information presented in
the warrant application, that there is probable cause to believe the items to be seized will
be at the designated place when the search is to take place." Id. (emphasis added). See also,
Validity of Anticipatory Search Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b ("A prosecutor
must be able to demonstrate that when a warrant is issued there exists concrete and reliable
evidence in a supporting affidavit that a crime will be committed in the near future or that an
item will be at a specific location in the near future").

5

The Utah Supreme Court did not reach the issue as to whether anticipatory warrants are
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.
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1

Conditions Precedent or "Triggering Events"

As noted above, "[p]robable cause to support anticipatory warrants is conditioned on the
occurrence of certain expected or triggering events, typically the future delivery, sale, or
purchase of contraband." Womack, 967 P.2d. at 543 (internal quotations omitted). "In
determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate therefore must take into account the
likelihood that the triggering events will occur on schedule and as predicted/' Id. (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Further, "because the probable cause underlying an anticipatory warrant depends on
whether certain events occur, the warrant or affidavit must state conditions allowing the search
to be done only after those expected events occur/' Womack, 967 P.2d at 543-44 (citing
Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1201). "This not only ensures against premature execution of the warrant,
but also maintains judicial control over the probable cause determination and over the
circumstances of the warrant's execution." Id. at 544. "Consistent with these goals, the
conditions controlling the warrant's execution should be explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so
as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents." Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted)(emphasis added). Importantly, an "anticipatory warrant is invalid if the
'triggering event' does not arise." Id.
"Along with assessing the probability that certain triggering events will happen, the
magistrate must also evaluate the probability that, following the triggering events, the
evidence will be in the named place when the search warrant is executed." Womack, 967
P.2d at 543 (emphasis added). "As with any warrant, probable cause for an anticipatory warrant
does not exist unless a sufficient nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched
exists.'" Id. (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
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"In short, the magistrate must not abandon the juristic role of assessing probable cause
by depending on police guarantees that the search will not be done unless there is probable
cause/' Id. "The magistrate must instead demand that police specifically show, on the facts
existing when the magistrate issues the warrant, that the evidence to be confiscated will be
at the named place when the search occurs." Id. (emphasis added).

B.

The Anticipatory Warrant Was Invalid Because The Conditions
Precedent Did Not Give Rise To Probable Cause That A Crime
Was Being or Would Be Committed.
L

No Probable Cause In General

The conditions set forth in the affidavit did not give rise to probable cause that any
crime would be committed or that any illegal controlled substance would be found at the
location.6
Anticipatory warrants must be supported by probable cause, and the magistrate must
determine, based on information presented in the warrant application, that there is probable
cause to believe the items seized will be at the designated place when the search is to take place.
''Utah's definition of probable cause is that there is a 'fair probability that evidence of the crime
will be found in the place or places named in the warrant."1 Womack at 541.
In this case the anticipated information shows only that the agent or the CI would offer
the mushrooms to the defendant. However, there is no condition precedent that established
the likelihood that the defendant would acquire possession of the drugs. Indeed, what was
presented to thf magistrate by affidavit in this case could be used to justify a search of any
residence so ioqgat there is an allegation that the government is going to take the drugs there
and offer them to the resident. It is important to remember that the warrant is judged by the

6

The defendant reserves the right to amend and/or supplement his grounds for a new trial
to include the possible improper execution of the anticipatory warrant, upon receipt and review
of the transcript in this case.
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content contained within the four corners of the document and not on the actual events which
occurred at the time of execution. Cf State v Potter, 860 P 2d 952, 955-56 and n 4 (Utah App
1993) (noting the general position that the determination of probable cause is based on whether
there "were enough facts within the affidavit," and that courts "are bound by the contents of the
affidavit") This warrant authorized a search regardless of how Dr Penn responded to the offer
of sale. The fact that Dr Penn accepted the drugs, is meaningless to this Court's analysis of the
validity of the warrant.
Further, despite a condition that the CFs vehicle and person would be searched prior to
entry, and researched subsequently, there is no condition explaining what should (or should not)
be found prior to entry of the house, nor that the mushrooms should not be present upon leaving
the residence Thus, the warrant authonzed a search even if the defendant refused the illegal
substance Consequently, the anticipatory information upon which the warrant was authorized
did not show a sufficient probability that, following the triggering events, any crime would be
committed or that any contraband would be in the named place when the actual search was
executed
Indeed, based on the warrant and the conditions, the defendant was required to commit
absolutely no illegal act in order for the search to proceed All triggering events were solely in
the hands of the agents and confidential informant Defendant could have refused the
mushrooms, told the individuals to leave, and after being thrown out of the house with the
mushrooms still in their custody, the warrant would have nonetheless authorized the
agents to search the residence. Cf Womack, 967 P 2d at 539 (defendant signed for and
accepted package).
1x

No Probable Cause To Search For All Drugs

Further, there was no probable cause to search for "all controlled substances" based on
one anticipated buy of mushrooms that were to be used for personal use "In addition to
authorizing search and seizure of the contraband related to the offense, many anticipatory
warrants also authorize search and seizure of evidence not directly related to the specific
13

offense on which the anticipatory warrant was issued." See Validity of Anticipatory Search
Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b (2002). This is so, because many courts have
reasoned that "when a large amount of contraband has been delivered to a defendants
premises in a controlled delivery, it is reasonable to infer that the defendant's premises will
house additional contraband of a similar nature." Id. (emphasis added). However, probable
cause must still exists to search for evidence from the search and seizure beyond that recovered
in the controlled delivery or buy. See id.
In this case, there was absolutely no admissible7 evidence that any other controlled
substances would be found on the premises sufficient to amount to probable cause. Thus, the
warrant's authorisation to search for any controlled substances not limited to the mushrooms is
improper, and effectively allowed an illegal general search.
Importantly, such authorization in this case cannot be justified by the reasoning that a
large amount of contraband was being delivered through a controlled sale. The justification for
a more complete search is justified in those situations where a defendant has sent narcotics to
himself through the mail, or where controlled purchases have been ongoing and continuous and
have amounted to the purchase of large quantities of controlled substances. This is so because
such large quantities is indicative of drug trafficking and distribution rings. In this case,
however, the undercover operation set up a one-time, small, controlled sale, that was clearly for
personal use. Such a controlled sale does not justify a complete search of the Defendant's entire
residence in hopes of finding other controlled substances.
Further, any information given by the unknown CI cannot be relied upon to support a
search for other substances as the affidavit supporting the warrant gave absolutely no indication

7

At the hearing on the motion to suppress the court was asked to exclude that part of the
warrant that was alleged to have been obtained from an illegal search conducted by the
confidential informant. The court specifically deferred consideration of that issue citing to the
sufficiency of the anticipatory part of the warrant.
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as to the CFs reliability, basis of knowledge, veracity and the like.

8

During the pretrial suppression hearing, this Court did not consider the reliability of the
CI in making its decision concerning the warrant, instead finding the anticipatory portion was
sufficient to uphold the warrant. However, the complete lack of information about the CI in the
affidavit in support of the warrant may become important in this case, with regard to probable
cause to search the residence for any other controlled substance but the mushrooms.
It has been clearly held that the "veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of
informants is a factor to considered within the totality of the circumstances" in making probable
cause determinations. See State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, (Utah App. 1991). For example, in
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989), the court found that the trial court erred in
denying a motion to suppress, in part, due to the lack of information concerning an informant.
The court noted:
Neither the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the
information was ever established. The record reveals nothing to
indicate how, when, or where the information was obtained. Sheriff
Judd stated that he had used the informant previously and found
"them" to be reliable, but there is no indication as to how many times
this occurred, when it last occurred, the circumstances, or even
whether it was one or more informants.
Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306.
The Court continued:
Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of
confidential informants are no longer strict prerequisites for
establishing probable cause, they are still "relevant considerations,
among others, in determining the existence of probable cause under
'a totality-of-the-circumstances. Otherwise, a court cannot determine
whether the information was obtained in the context of unreliable
circumstances such as casual rumor.
Droneburg,l%\ P.2dat 1306.
In this case, a review of the Affidavit in support of the warrant offers absolutely no
information concerning the CI. The magistrate was given absolutely no indication of the
reliability or veracity of the CI; was not given the foundation or basis of knowledge for how
the CI made his/her alleged observations; nor was the magistrate given any indication whether
the CI made the alleged observations legally. Importantly, there is no suggestion, for a
majority of the CI's assertions, when the observations were made, and as such, much of the
CI's assertions of wrongdoing could have been based on stale information. Finally, the
affidavit makes no showing of any attempt to corroborate the CI's information concerning
improper use of prescriptions, that could justify a search for prescription medications in the
Penn residence.
As such, the Defendant reserves the right to amend and/or supplement his grounds for
a new trial to include the possible CI reliability issues, as well as possible Franks issues, upon
receipt and review of the transcript.
15

Finally, had this been a simple controlled by for $80.00 worth of mushrooms absent a
warrant, the defendant could have admittedly been arrested for the mushroom offense.
However, a search of the entire house would still not have been authorized "incident to arrest."
Police reports indicate the Hydrocodone was found in the bathroom medicine cabinet, and the
demerol was found in the refrigerator. Surely, a random search of the house incident to arrest
would not have been authorized. See e.g., State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah App. 1998)
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) for well established proposition that search of
area within arrestee's immediate control permissible incident to arrest, but "state must
demonstrate that the area searched was reasonably within defendant's control" since there is no
justification "for routinely searching any room other than that in which arrest occurs-or, for that
matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas...").

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those to be presented at hearing on this motion, it is
respectfully requested that this Court grant the defendant a new trial in this matter.
^

DATED this

,,/

day of January 2003.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorneys for Defendant
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day of January 2003.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW (#3768)
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BROWN, BRADSHAW & MOFFAT, L.L.P.
10 West Broadway, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-5297
Facsimile: (801) 532-5298
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

v.
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,

Case No.021700243
(Judge Lyle Anderson)

Defendant.

Defendant, through counsel, hereby submits this supplemental memorandum in support
of his motion for new trial. In doing so, the Defendant reasserts the point and authorities set forth
in his initial memorandum, and provides the following supplemental information and argument
in support.
INTRODUCTION
As noted in the Defendant's initial memorandum, there were several errors or
improprieties in the trial of this matter that had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the
Defendant. These errors fall within three general categories: 1) errors regarding the jury
instructions given in this case at trial; 2) errors regarding the anticipatory warrant in this case and
its execution; and 3) discovery violations on the part of the state and the failure of the
prosecution to disclose material information to the defense. The errors regarding the jury
instructions have beenfrillybriefed in the Defendant's previous memorandum. The second two
issues will be briefed and/or supplemented herein.

Standing alone, each error, illegality, and piece of new evidence raised herein warrants a
new trial Some of the above issues were properly raised, objected to, and ruled upon prior to the
trial of this matter Some were not Inasmuch as prior trial counsel failed to properly object to or
raise any of these specific issues, such amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel which also
forms the basis for the granting of a new trial.

SUPPLEMENTAL RELEVANT FACTS
Facts Relevant to the Execution of the Anticipatory Warrant
and the Questioning of the Defendant
1

As noted in previous memorandum, on April 19, 2002, Investigator Rob Johnson

("Johnson") from the DEA sought and obtained an anticipatory search warrant to search the
residence located at 300 East 300 South, in Moab, Utah
2

Section 6 of the Affidavit is titled "Anticipatory Information" and states
On April 20, 2002, between 10 00 and noon, DEA agents will meet with CI
CI and an undercover agent (UC) will be searched and CI will be wired CI
or UC will be given some psilocybin mushroom Cl's vehicle will also be
searched CI and an undercover agent will drive in Cl's vehicle to the above
described residence of Penn and Drew with the mushrooms Agents will
have CI and UC under visual and audio observation at all times driving to
and from said residence They will have CI and UC under audio observation
while they are in the residence It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or controlled
substance prescriptions After CI and UC leave the residence, CI and UC
and Cl's vehicle will be researched.

(Emphasis added).
3

Based on the affidavit, officers obtained a search warrant which stated that the

"search warrant is valid only upon the occurrence of the events descnbed in the affidavit for this
anticipatory search warrant."

2

4.

Investigator Robert Johnson has testified under oath1 regarding the circumstances

concerning the search and arrest of Mr Penn 2 In doing so, Johnson stated the following
a.

As soon as LaPlante and Bacon left the Penn residence after the

controlled sale, and were away from the door, an entry team immediately went into the
residence and secured the home, including handcuffing Penn. See id at 17-20
b.

Johnson is not aware of anyone searching LaPlante or Bacon prior to the

entry into the Penn residence to execute the warrant. See id at 20-22.
c.

Johnson is not aware of anyone searching LaPlante's vehicle prior to the

entry into Penn's residence to execute the warrant See id at 21-22.
d.

When Johnson goes into the residence, Penn has already been handcuffed

and is seated at the kitchen table. See id at 20:10-20, 81, 85.
e.

The officers indicated that they knew Penn had just purchased

mushrooms, that they had a search warrant, and that it would be to his benefit to tell where they
were because the officers would find them anyway. See id at 82.

'AH testimony offered herein was given during the course of depositions which were
conducted as part of a civil suit- Gene and Lisa LaPlante v Nathaniel Penn Case No 2 03CV00125DAK. All testimony is under oath and is attached hereto Generally the lawsuit alleges
Penn's malpractice in treating Gene LaPlante. Lisa LaPlante has alleged that Dr Perm's medical
malpractice caused her husband, to threaten her with an automatic assault rifle In order to get
her husband out of trouble, she alleges that she was forced to make a deal with the DEA, and
therefore, Dr. Penn is liable for alleged damages she suffered as a consequence of her service as
a DEA agent.
The excerpts attached and included herein are offered on topics about which there
appears to be no factual dispute. The State has been given advance notice that the transcripts
woult oe offered at the hearing on the motion for new trial However, if the Court or the State
wants the witnesses to appear and provide live testimony, they can be present with some advance
notice
2

The relevant portions of the Deposition of Robert Johnson, dated May 9, 2003,
referenced herein are attached as "Exhibit A."
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f.

In response, Perm indicated that the mushrooms were in a kitchen drawer

g.

Subsequently, officers mirandized Penn, and asked if he wanted to give a

See id.

statement. See id.. Penn indicated he wanted an attorney at that time. See id.
5.

The confidential informant, Lisa LaPlante, has testified under oath concerning

this matter.3 In doing so, she stated the following:
a.

As part of the controlled sale, Ms. LaPlante went into the Penn residence

with undercover agent Mark Bacon. See Deposition of Lisa LaPlante, dated May 28, 2003 at 7273.
b.

After leaving the house, and within seconds, agents immediately "flew in

from everywhere." Id. at 73:23, 75.
c.

LaPlante was not searched before the warrant was executed and prior

to officers entering Penn's residence. See id. at 74:4-9. In fact, LaPlante confirms that she was
not re-searched until after the agents entered the defendant's house to execute the warrant. See
id at 74-10-12.
d.

La Plante's vehicle was not searched between the time she left Penn's

residence and other agents entered. See id. at 75:9-24.
Facts Relating to Illegal Search and Discovery Violations
Regarding Lisa LaPIante's Role As An Agent of Police
6.

In January of 2002, Ms. LaPlante had a meeting with Mr. Bill Benge, and agreed

to become a confidential informant. See Deposition of Lisa LaPlante at 34-36; Deposition of

3

The relevant portions of the Deposition of Lisa LaPlante, dated May 28, 2003,
referenced herein, are attached as "Exhibit B."
4

Gene Laplante, dated May 27, 2003, at 197.4
7.

Ms. LaPlante agreed to become an information so that pending felony charges

against her husband, Gene LaPlante, would "go away." Id. at 35:11-18; 37. See also Deposition
of Gene Laplante at 191-193 (noting he was charged with felony aggravated assault concerning
an incident on January 9, 2002 involving displaying a firearm toward his wife). The arrangement
was that the charges would "go away" if LaPlante agreed to help in the government's
investigation of Dr. Penn. See Deposition of Lisa LaPlante at 36:7-12; 37; Deposition of Gene
LaPlante at 193-197. Additionally, Ms. Laplante received financial payment for her cooperation.
See Deposition of Gene Laplante at 199.
8.

Ms. LaPlante agreed to cooperate in the investigation concerning Dr. Penn. See

Deposition of Lisa LaPlante at 33-36. Subsequently, Ms. LaPlante submitted reports concerning
Dr. Penn. See id. at 37.
9.

Months later, Ms. LaPlante spoke to Officer Johnson and Bacon in a meeting at

her house. See id. at 38-39. There, she signed an agreement with the DEA to become an
undercover agent. See id. at 53:1-7.
10.

After becoming an agent, Ms. LaPlante went into the Penn residence under the

pretenses of "looking for a key" to a shed. See id. at 56:7-10.
11.

Ms. LaPlante never retrieved the key or the records she claimed she was looking

for. See id. at 56:21-22.
12.

Instead of looking for the key, Ms. LaPlante searched the refrigerator and

bathroom cabinets to look for Demerol and Lortab. See id. at 57. Such information was part of

4

The relevant portions of the Deposition of Gene LaPlante, dated May 27, 2003,
referenced herein, are attached as "Exhibit C."
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the information Ms. LaPlante was expected to provide to the DEA. See id at 57.16-18 Ms
LaPlante admitted she was 'looking to see if there were drugs in there to report to the DEA.11 Id
13.

Ms. LaPlante admitted that she initially went in the residence to look for the key,

but decided to expand the search for the purpose of looking for evidence of drug possession. See
id at 59-10-14. Ms. LaPlante admits that she received permission from Drew only to search for
the key See id at 60:2-9.
14.

The very day Ms. LaPlante made her observations, she told the DEA agents See

id at 60-15-22.
15

Ms. Laplante's indication that she had seen controlled substances in Dr. Perm's

house was used as support of probable cause in the affidavit in support of the search warrant.
See Deposition of Robert Johnson, dated May 9, 2003, at 60-62; Affidavit in Support of Search
Warrant.
16.

Prior to trial, on July 16, 2002, defense counsel Greg Skordas, filed a motion for

discovery under Utah rule of Criminal procedure 16 requesting, ''evidence known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the Defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment," as well as any "recordings, reports,
transcripts, or reports about statements in possession of any member, or group involved in the
prosecution or investigation of the ... case taken from the witnesses..." See Request For
Discovery, dated July 16, 2002.
17.

TttiState never disclosed to trial counsel the "deal" that had been reached

between Lisa LaPlante and the State regarding Ms. LaPlante's aid in the investigation of the
matter and her testimony at trial, and never provided the records of payment. See Affidavit of
Gregory Skordas, attached as "Exhibit D."
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18.

Additionally, it has recently become known that investigators prepared additional

reports in this matter that may have contained exculpatory information that was not disclosed in
discovery See Deposition of Robert Johnson, at 31, 39-40, 45 (affirming that reports were
generated concerning interviews with Ms. Angie Stoughton, Ms Mane Packard, and pharmacist
Mr Mike Goyne, and that Ms. Stoughton and Packard had some favorable things to say about
Penn) See also, Affidavit of Gregory Skordas.
ARGUMENT
I.

A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE
ANTICIPATORY WARRANT WAS INVALID, NOT
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE, AND WAS
IMPROPERLY EXECUTED.

In previous memorandum, the Defendant has asserted that the anticipatory search warrant
issued in this case was invalid and illegally executed for several reasons. See Memorandum in
Support of New Trial. Therein, the Defendant asserted that the warrant, on the face of its four
corners, did not establish probable cause that a crime would likely be committed because the
warrant authorizes a search based solely on an "offer" of illegal substances and there is a
complete absence of any condition establishing a likelihood that the defendant would "acquire
possession" of drugs. See id. at 12-13.
Previous memorandum has also noted that the affidavit in support of the warrant was
wholly void of any information regarding the reliability, basis of knowledge, and veracity of the
CI, and therefore, the warrant is invalid. See id at 14-15, and n 8
The Defendant has also relied on the proposition, which is supplemented herein, that
because the requisite "triggerng events" did not occur, the warrant, again, is invalid and all
evidence seized as a result of the warrant should have been suppressed.
The warrant is also called into question for a separate and distinct reason: some of the
7

information used in the warrant to support probable cause was obtained by the CI at a time
where the CI illegally searched Defendant's residence while operating as an agent of the
government. As such, any evidence that the CI discovered was illegally obtained and/or relied
upon in support of the search warrant in this case should have been omitted, and without such
information, and based on the problems already noted with the warrant and affidavit, there was
insufficient information to establish probable cause.
Finally, upon execution of the search warrant, the investigators improperly questioned
Mr. Penn in violation of Miranda, and as such, all statements he allegedly made should have
been suppressed.
Based on all of these reasons, this Court should find that the warrant in this case was
invalid and improperly executed, thus rendering any evidence obtained as a result improperly
admitted at trial. Accordingly, this Court should grant Defendant's Motion for a New Trial.

A.

The Anticipatory Warrant Was Invalid
JL

The Requisite Triggering Events
Never Occurred.

As stated in previous memorandum, an "anticipatory warrant is invalid if the triggering
event does not arise." State v. Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 544 (Utah 1998). Clearly, in this case, the
anticipatory warrant was prematurely executed before the requisite "triggering events" occurred.
Despite the explicit language that the warrant is "valid only upon the occurrence of the
events described in the affidavit," the requisite re-searching of La Plante, the undercover
agent, and La Planters vehicle did not take place before the warrant was executed and the
warrant is therefore rendered invalid and its execution illegal. Simply put-the triggering events
making the search proper never occurred. Consequently, the evidence obtained pursuant to the
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invalid warrant should have been suppressed, and failure to suppress had a substantial adverse
effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial This Court should therefore grant defendant a new
trial pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a).
2L

The Anticipatory Warrant Was Not Properly
Supported By Probable Cause Since Information
Illegally Obtained Should Have Been Omitted

Another problem with the warrant in this case, is that it was supported, in part, by
information that was obtained illegally by the confidential informant who was acting as an agent
of the police.5
"The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures protects
only against governmental actions and does not extend to the independent acts of private
citizens.MS/ate v McArthur, 996 P 2d 555, 560 (Utah App 2000) (quoting State v Watts, 750
P 2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988)). "However, a search conducted by a private person acting as a
government agent is not a private search "McArthur, 996 P 2d at 560 (internal quotations and
brackets omitted). " In such an instance, the protections of the fourth amendment do have
application " Id See also, State v Watts, 750 P 2d 1219 (Utah 1988) (setting forth framework of
agency relationship), State v Koury, 824 P 2d 474 (Utah App 1991) (same)
Additionally, and important to the issues in this case, although "the Fourth Amendment
allows undercover police agents to conduct warrantless searches in places to which they have
been invited, the Fourth Amendment requires that the search not exceed the scope of the

5

More specifically, the affidavit in support of the warrant states*
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence described
above as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, and saw
some multi-dose vials of Demerol in their refrigerator CI also saw
some oxycontin in a prescription bottle, labeled with the name of
Robert Silver, in the bathroom.
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invitation " Id at 562. "If he or she is invited onto private property, a government agent does
not need probable cause nor warrant to enter so long as he does not exceed the scope of his
invitation " Id. Indeed, once "inside the house, an agent may not exceed the scope of his
invitation by ransacking the house generally, but he may seize anything in plain view " Id
(internal brackets omitted)
In this case, the confidential informant was acting as an agent at the time of the search
By this time, Ms LaPlante had already entered into an arrangement with the prosecutor for
information in the investigation of Dr Penn. Ms LaPlante's testimony clearly shows that she
was motivated in searching the Penn residence for narcotics in order to provide such information
to the DEA Further, LaPlante entered the premises under the pretense of searching for a key,
and while in the residence, looked in closed containers and private areas for evidence Notably,
areas where a key is unlikely to be found.
Thus, any information in the warrant obtained as a result of this illegal search should
have been stricken. Cf State v Nielsen, 111 P 2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) (noting that "if an
affidavit fails to support a finding of probable cause after the false statements are excised or the
omitted information is added, the omission or misstatement materially affects the finding of
probable cause, any evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be
suppressed") This illegally obtained information, in conjunction with the problems of the
warrant noted above, and in Defendant's initial memorandum regarding probable cause in
general and the absolute lack of information about the CI, renders the affidavit in support of the
warrant wholly lacking in probable cause, and therefore all evidence obtained as a result of this
warrant should have been suppressed. Consequently, improper information was presented to the
jury and a new trial is warranted
3.

Insofar as The Issues Concerning The
Warrant's Invalidity Was Not Raised Bv
Prior Counsel. Such Constitutes Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel.

Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress in this case on September 5, 2002. Therein,
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counsel argued that the warrant lacked probable cause since there "was no more than mere
speculation that the Defendant would purchase the mushrooms from the DEA agent and
therefore have them in his possession/1 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Suppress, at 4. The memorandum further explains, that the warrant was improper since there was
no more in the warrant affidavit than "an offer," and as such, there was "no statement or
assurance that the defendant would purchase the substance or that he would subsequently [have]
anything in his possession." Id. at n.l.
Although prior counsel did file a motion to suppress, insofar as Mr. Skordas failed to
appropriately and fully raise the additional issues surrounding the warrant now presented to & ->
Court, such constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and a new trial is warranted.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have assistance of
counsel for his defense." U.S. Const., amend VI. See also State v Templin, 805 P 2d 182, 186
(Utah 1990). "The right to counsel has been held to be 'the right to effective assistance of
counsel.'" Id (citations omitted). Utah courts follow the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U S. 668, 687 (1984). See Templin, 805 P 2d at 186.
Importantly, the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence can form the basis for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See, Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U S 365 (1986),
State v Snyder, 860 P 2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to timely file a meritorious motion to
suppress statements on Miranda grounds requires new trial). To prevail on this claim, the
defendant must demonstrate that the motion was meritorious and would have affected the
outcome of the trial.
As note4£Nrviously, failure to raise the issues surrounding the warrant and its probable
cause determination now presented to this Court fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Importantly, as set forth above in detail, a motion to suppress should have been
filed outlining the numerous issues regarding the warrant's shortcomings, including the facts that
the triggering events never occurred, that the warrant was substantially based on information by
a CI in which there was absolutely no information as to the basis of knowledge, or veracity, and
11

the fact that some of the information contained in the affidavit was based on an illegal search
Such claims are meritorious, justify suppression oft he evidence seized in this case, and would
have clearly affected the outcome of the trial.
B.

Any Statement Made by Penn Should Have Been
Suppressed as Obtained in Violation of Miranda.

Once a person is "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way," it is incumbent upon the police to provide Miranda warnings before seeking to
elicit incriminating statements from the in-custody defendant Accord Miranda v Arizona, 384
US 436, 444(1966).
Here, Mr Penn was clearly in custody At the time of the questioning concerning
the contraband, officers had entered Mr Penn's residence, and Penn had been handcuffed and
placed under the direct supervision of at least one police officer while other officers searched his
home.
He was not free to leave and was suspected of criminal activity Additionally, there was
express questioning regarding the location of the contraband inside the house with "words and
actions" likely to elicit a response. Officers asked repeatedly where the drugs were located, and
when Mr Penn denied knowledge, the officers replied that they knew he had just purchased the
mushrooms, that they had a search warrant, and that it would be to his benefit to tell where they
were because the officers would find them anyway In that situation, the police were required to
provide the Miranda safeguards.
Based on these facts, the failure to give Miranda warnings would have resulted in the
suppression of Penn's initial statement to the police at his home had trial counsel filed a motion
to suppress.
Moreover, based on authority stated previously, trial counsel's failure to raise such issue
constitutes ineffective assistance. See State v Snyder, 860 P 2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to
timely file a meritorious motion to suppress statements on Miranda grounds requires new trial)
A reading of the police reports and testimony from the preliminary hearing should have at least
12

prompted counsel to conduct flirther investigation or file the motion to suppress There could be
no tactical reason not to seek suppression, because trial counsel did seek to exclude evidence on
other unrelated theories. Had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the statements on Fifth
Amendment grounds, there is a strong likelihood that this motion would have been granted
II.

THE STATE'S NONDISCLOSURE OF THE DEAL
BETWEEN THE STATE AND A MATERIAL STATE
WITNESS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
A.

Law Regarding Prosecutorial Duty
To Disclose Evidence.

"It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its
possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment "
Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 U S. 39, 57 (1987) A prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence violates a defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Seeeg, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U S. 83 (1963);
Kyles v Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v Augurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). These legal
principles apply equally in the consideration of the state due process clause under Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. See, eg Walker v State, 624 P 2d 687 (Utah 1981)
"In a criminal trial it is essential that evidence which tends to exonerate the defendant be aired as
fully as that which tends to implicate him." State v Jarrell, 608 P 2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980)6
6

In addition, under Utah discovery law, upon request by the defendant, the prosecution is
required to disclose I) the relevant written or recorded statements of a co-defendant, and 2)
evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment. "The prosecutor
has a continuing duty to make disclosure." U R.Cr P , Rule 16(b), Parson v Galetka, 57
FSupp2d 1151 (D.Utah 1995).
Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rule of criminal procedure also provides broad authority to the
trial court to remedy a violation of the discovery rules State v Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah
1989). That rule reads: "If at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with [Rule 16], the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances." [emphasis added.] A new trial may be ordered upon a violation of discovery
under Rule 16. State v Martin, 1999 UT 72, 984 P 2d 975 (Martin I) [new trial denied on
13

This obligation to disclose applies equally to impeachment evidence and to evidence that
was not requested by the defense. See Stnckler v Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999), United
States v Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676(1985); Gighov United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).7
Moreover, the "state's obligation to disclose is not limited to information in the custody
of the prosecutor." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. "The law imposes a duty upon the individual
prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police." Id, This is so because the "prosecution, which alone
can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely
net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of'reasonable probability' is
reached." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. As such, there is no leeway to hold back evidence because of
uncertainty about whether the evidence would prove exculpatory at trial. "[T]he government
simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to
portend such an effect on a trial's outcome as to destroy confidence in its result." Id at 439.
This is consistent with the Court's long held view that "a prudent prosecutor will resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. See also, State v Bakalov,
1999 UT 45, P38 ("It is not for a prosecutor to substitute his or her judgment for that of a
defendant with respect to whether exculpatory evidence is sufficiently material to warrant
disclosure... Where a judgment call must be made...doubts should be resolved in favor of
disclosure").
B.

Applicable Standard For New Trial
Based on Non-Disclosure.

violation of this rule solely because defendant did not make a Rule 16 request].
7

As noted, the United States Supreme Court has also applied this rule to impeachment
evidence. See eg., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). This is so because "[wjhen
the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule of Brady" 405 U.S. at
154. See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (explaining that "such evidence is 'evidence favorable to
an accused,'... so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between
conviction and acquittal").
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Failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence warrants a new trial where there is
prejudice to the Defendant. See Strickler, 527 U S at 281-82 Prejudice occurs when the State's
failure to disclose affects the Defendant's fundamental rights-such as a right to a fair trial See
United States v Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). A Defendant's right to a fair trial is
undermined when the undisclosed evidence is material, meaning, where "there is reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Id at 682.
A "showing of materiality" however, "does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the
defendant's acquittal" Kyles v Whitley, 514 U S 419, 434(1995) The question is "not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence." Id. (emphasis added).
Further, a "defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory
evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict
The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary
basis to convict." Id at 435.
C.

Evidence Not Disclosed By The Prosecution
Requires a New Trial.'

insofar as tnal counsel did not specifically question the witness at trial regarding any
deals made with the prosecution, such constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel based on a
failure to properly investigate and impeach the witness See Strickland, 466 U S at 690
(discussing tnal counsel duty to investigate); Taylor v Warden, 905 P 2d 277, 283 (Utah 1995)
("Sufficient performance requires that counsel adequately investigate the underlying facts of the
case"), State v Tyler, 850 P2d 1250,1255 (Utah 1993), State v Temphn, 805 P 2d 182, 188
(Utah 1990)).
Further, several jurisdictions find that the failure to impeach a witness may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. See eg., Moffett v Kolb, 930 F 2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir.1991)
(finding that failure to question witness on inconsistent statements constituted ineffective
assistance); Nixon v Newsome, 888 F 2d 112, 116 (1 Ith Cir 1989) (stating that court would
"have no difficulty concluding that the attorney's actions were not within the wide range of
professional competence" especially when faced "with glaring" discrepancies between testimony
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In this case, the State failed to disclose material information in violation of its duty,
including: 1) the deal stricken between Ms Laplante and the prosecution for her aide m the
investigation and testimony, including any monetary payments made to her; and 2) investigative
reports of interviews of three witnesses that seemingly had exculpatory information.
First, evidence of the "deal" between the State and Ms. LaPlante should have been
disclosed, and goes directly to the credibility of LaPlante's testimony Such information would
have clearly affected counsel's preparation for tnal and presentation of the case to the jury
Further, Ms. LaPlante was the most important witness of the State's case, and a detailed attack
on her credibility based on this undisclosed information would have likely resulted in a different
outcome.
Further, it has recently become known that investigators prepared additional reports in
this matter that may have contained exculpatory information that was not disclosed to the
defense More specifically, Investigator Johnson has indicated that he personally prepared
reports of interviews with Angle Stoughton, Mane Packard, and pharmacist. Mike Goyne
Counsel has yet to see those reports in order to judge the materiality of such evidence, but,
according to Johnson, the witnesses had some "favorable" things to say.
CONCLUSION
In Sum, throughout the Defendant1 initial memorandum and this supplemental
memorandum, the Defendant urges this Court to grant a new trial for numerous reasons,
including:
1)

the jury instructions given in this case were plainly erroneous and deprived

Defendant Penn the right to a fair tnal;
2)

the anticipatory warrant in this matter was invalid, not supported by probable

during two hearings); State v Simpson, 946 P.2d 890, 892 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (finding
ineffective assistance where attorney did not make tactical decision but completely failed to
perceive the worth of the impeachment information he had before him). But see, State v
Maestas, 997 P 2d 314, 319 (Utah App. 2000), cert denied, 4 P 3d 1289 (Utah 2000) (finding no
ineffective assistance in failure to impeach where no prejudice shown).
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cause, and improperly executed because
a.

the "triggering events11 necessary to the validity of the anticipatory

warrant never occurred;
b.

the warrant, on the face of its four corners, did not establish

probable cause that a crime would likely be committed because the warrant authonzes a search
based solely on an "offer" of illegal substances by the CI and undercover agent, and there is an
absence of any condition that established a likelihood that the defendant would "acquire
possession" of the drugs;
c.

the affidavit in support of the warrant was wholly void of any

information regarding the reliability, basis of knowledge, and veracity of the CI, and
d.

some of the information relied upon by the police officers in

establishing probable cause for the warrant was obtained as a result of an illegal search
performed by the CI as an agent of the police, and should have been omitted, and
e.

statements made by Penn while he was handcuffed at his residence

dunng the time of the search should have been suppressed since such statements were obtained
in violation of Miranda v Arizona',
3)

the State improperly failed to disclose exculpatory information regarding a

deal made with a matenal witness that goes to the heart of the witness's credibility, and other
information from additional witnesses recently made known to the Defendant.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that this
Court grant the Defendant's motion and order a new tnal in this matter.

DATED this

/ ^flay of June 2003

'JAMBS*; 'BRADSHAW
Atto/ney for Defendant
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL was mailed, postage
prepaid, to, Happy Morgan, Grand County Attorney, 125 E. Center St., Moab, Utah, 84532, on
the JQ

day of June 2003.
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Addendum E

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Case No.0217-243

NATHANIEL F. PENN,
Defendant,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant, Nathaniel Penn ("Penn"), has moved the court for
a new trial.

The State objected.

The Court addresses each

argument in turn.
VALIDITY OF WARRANT
Penn complains that the search warrant that led to the
discovery of illegal drugs in his home was invalid.

Penn

challenged the validity of the warrant before his trial and that
challenge was denied.

Penn renews some of the same arguments

raised before trial and some new arguments as well.
The Court sees no reason to change its analysis of the
arguments raised earlier.

As to the arguments raised now for tne

first time, those arguments are rejected because:

STATE OF UTAH
vs
NATHANIEL PENN
1.

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 2

Even though the affidavit failed to recite that the
officers expected Penn to accept the offer of drugs,
the affidavit does give good reason to believe that he
would accept the offer.

The magistrate clearly

intended that acceptance of the offer would be the
trigger for execution of the warrant, and the conduct
of the officers shows that they understood this as
well.
2.

Even though the affiant said that the confidential
informant and her car would be searched, the warrant
did not clearly specify that the search must occur
before the warrant would be valid.

Had that question

been specifically addressed, this Court is confident
that the magistrate would not have conditioned the
warrant's validity on the search having previously
occurred, especially given that a DEA agent was to
personally participate m the transaction.
3.

With regards to the psiiocybm possession charge, the
evidence against Penn was overwhelming, even without
the mushrooms themselves.

STATE OP UTAH
vs
NATHANIEL PENN

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 3
PENN'S STATEMENT

Penn has not persuaded the Court that the failure of his
previous counsel to seek to suppress his pre-Miranda statements
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

It is not obvious

that Penn was in custody at the time he was asked about the
location of the drugs.

In addition, the Court does not believe

that Penn suffered any prejudice at trial from admission of his
pre-Miranda statements.
THE DEAL BETWEEN THE STATE AND GENE AND LISA LAPLANTE
Penn has presented evidence from depositions in a civil case
that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss aggravated assault charges
against Gene LaPlante in exchange for Lisa LaPlante's cooperation
with law enforcement.

Penn has presented no evidence that other

charges against Gene LaPlant were part of the deal.

Penn's trial

counsel elicited testimony at trial that Gene LaPlante was
permitted to plead guilty to Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon,
a Class A Misdemeanor, a lesser offense of Aggravated Assault, a
Third Degree Felony, and that his plea was held in abeyance, with
eventual dismissal if Gene LaPlante complied with certain
conditions unrelated to this case.

The Court's records in that

case, of which the Court takes notice, support this testimony.

STATE OP UTAH
vs
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RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 4

It is evident from the record that Penn's trial counsel knew
of the disposition of the charges against Gene LaPlante.

It is

also evident that he chose to use evidence of Gene LaPlante's
charge and conviction in two ways.

First, counsel attempted to

portray Lisa LaPlante as a person affected by her unreasonable
anger towards Penn.

His theory was that Lisa was angry at Penn

for calling the police when Gene threatened her with a gun.
Second, though not strictly relevant to the issues in the case,
counsel attempted to portray Lisa LaPlante as an ungrateful
recipient of Penn's generosity.

Counsel never asked LaPlante

whether she had received any promises in exchange for her
testimony.

Indeed, since Gene LaPlante's case had been disposed

of already, there would have been little reason for the jury to
give such evidence significant weight.

Penn's trial counsel

correctly chose the more productive approach of using evidence of
Gene LaPlantefs charges to portray Lisa LaPlante as
and ungrateful.

vindictive

This strategy was not objectively unreasonable
THE THREE WITNESSES

Penn complained that witness statement of Angie Stoughton,
Marie Packard, and Robert Silver were not disclosed and contained
"favorable" statements about Penn

The Court has reviewed those

STATE OP UTAH
vs
NATHANIEL PENN

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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written statements, and finds nothing there that would have
helped Penn that was not presented to the ]ury.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
This case presented an interesting question; a doctor
possessing and dispensing prescription drugs without following
the procedures outlined in statutes governing prescriptions of
drugs.

The evidence was undisputed that Penn did not fill out

the forms required by law to acquire narcotics for dispensing in
his clinic.

Instead, he wrote prescriptions for office

employees, even though the employee did not need the narcotic,
and then had the employee bring the drug back to the office.
Undisputed evidence also was introduced that some patients of
Penn brought unused portions of narcotic prescriptions back to
Penn and that Penn dispensed those narcotics.

Whether Penn

required that any record of such dispensing be kept was disputed.
The Court sought input from Penn's trial counsel concerning
how to instruct the jury about the charges of illegal possession
of prescription drugs. While Penn now claims that failing to
keep records of dispensing is at rose a misdemeanor, that was not
his position at trial.

He may well have elected to accede to the

language proposed by the Court in order to avoid different, less

STATE OF UTAH
vs
NATHANIEL PENN
favorable language.

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 6
For example, the ]ury might have been

instructed that any doctor who acquires narcotics for office use
by writing a prescription for an employee without medical need is
possessing the narcotic illegally.
Utah's appellate courts have given no guidance on how to
instruct a jury in a case like this.

In the absence of clear

authority, the decision of Penn's counsel to accept language that
was arguably more favorable than other alternatives is not
objectively unreasonable.

Penn cannot now be permitted to second

guess that decision and obtain a new trial with a different
instruction, followed if necessary by a third trial with yet a
third version of the instructions.
The motion for new trial is denied.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 021700243 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

By Hand

NAME
JAMES C BRADSHAW
ATTORNEY DEF
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SUITE 210
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instruction, possession instructions.
Now a hard question.

When is the doctor

illegally possessed of a controlled substance?

That's

what I can tell the jurors have been thinking ahead and
struggling with that.
legally possessed.

When it's a substance that can be

I looked at the code, and what I saw

was that a doctor has to have a prescription for his own
use, the same as anybody else.
MR. BENGE:
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

Yes.
For his own use?
For his own use.
Sure.
Okay.
For his personal use.
For personal use.

And I also -- I

also interpreted the statute to permit practitioners who
are licensed to prescribe to also maintain a supply on
hand to dispense or administer.

Do you both agree with

that?
MR. SKORDAS:

Yes.

MR. BENGE:

If it complies with the record

THE COURT:

And then they have to keep

keeping.

records, right.

Okay.

Now, what I -- just what I've worked out at

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

1

tnis point on that subject

is physicians

2

practiced to prescribe controlled substances must

3

obtain a prescription for controlled substances for

4

personal use.

5

administer controlled substances are also permitted to

6

possess reasonable quantities of controlled

7

for dispensing or administering

3

are required to keep a record of controlled

9

received

3:_1

physicians licensed to dispense or

substances

to patients, but they
substances

for that purpose and dispensed or administered

10

by them as physicians

11

this requirement is possessing

12

illegally.

13

licensed or

A physician who fails to follov
those substances

And that rela:es back to an element in the

14

instruction, elements in the instruction I say that the

15

state has to prove that it was possessed without a

16

prescription or without otherwise complying

17

about right to you°

(Inaudible) actual

13

MR. SKORDAS:

Right.

19

MR. BENGE:

I think so.

20

THE COURT:

Okay

That

so. n a

language

I think so

Those are the only things

21

that I had questions about betore I start the typevr^ter

22

going.

23

point that I can try to incorporate in the instructions

24

that's kind of popped up since 9

25

through all this schedule one and schedule two business

Anything either of you //ant to bring out at t^.s

I'm going to shortcut

CitiCourt LLC
801.532 3441
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THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Counsel, have you seen the instructions I
propose to give?
MR. SKORDAS:

Yes, your Honor.

MR. BENGE:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Any exceptions, any problems?

MR. BENGE:

No exceptions.

THE COURT:

Mr. Skordas?

MR. SKORDAS:

A couple, your Honor.

They're not numbered, but there are a few, so
I submitted some proposed jury instructions, and I
assumed that those are part of the Court's records.
THE COURT:

I have them.

MR. SKORDAS:

There's a ]ury instruction

thai

begins, your Honor, it's about number seven or eighi,
hydrocodone and meperidine are controlled
it's a very short

substances

instruction.

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. SKORDAS:

And may be legally prescribed.

I would only ask that that be amended to say, may be
legally prescribed and legally possessed.
sentence talks about

The next

legally prescribed and legally

possessed, and I would ask the Court to make that
amendment to that

instruction.

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

With respect to the next page -THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:

I'll make that change.
-- I would ask the Court to

strike the very last sentence.
THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:

Why?
Well, because the law, I think

what the Court's attempted to do is to restate the
statute, and the statute speaks for itself.
THE COURT:

So you want me to give the statute

to the jury to read?
MR. SKORDAS:

No, no.

I want you to quit at

the end of the statute, which is what you would have
done had you not added that last sentence.
is the statute.

You paraphrased

That sort of

it, but I think in a

way that makes sense logically to the jurors, and that
would be my only request with respect to that
ins t rue t ion.
MR. BENGE:
remain.

I guess I would ask that it

I think in the rest of the course of the

instructions it explains things in the alternative.

If

you find this, you find that, if you don't find this,
you find that.

I think that that shows both sides of

the issue.
THE COURT:

I put it in to link up the illegal

language in the elements instruction with something that

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

defines that.

In order to prevent the jury from saying

well, okay, he's supposed to do that.
do that.

He's permitted t:

If he doesn't do it, is it illegal?

I think

it's obvious, but I've had enough jurors ask me
questions like that, that I felt I better state the
obvious so they can watch that if they find this on you:
exception.

That is noted but overruled.

important to

I think it's

(inaudible).

MR. SKORDAS:

The next

instruction

(inaudible) .
THE COURT:

You want me to give that one?

That was sort of iffy whether you want me to or not.

I

won't give that if you don't want me to, Mr. Skordas,
but I think it helps your client more than it
( inaudible) .
MR. SKORDAS:

I was bothered by it until I

read it enough times, and I agree.

(Inaudible).

I

guess I'm a skeptic when I see things.
There's an instruction about five later that
begins, although a person.

It's a three-paragraph

ins truction.
THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:

That's the nonexclusive.
Correct.

I would simply ask

Court to strike the final paragraph in its entirety.
THE COURT:

Okay.

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

the

MR. SKORDAS:

My basis for that is I'm not

sure that's -- where we get that.

I guess that

follows

common sense reasoning, and maybe the Court was trying
to direct the jury, but I'm just a little concerned that
it may tend to too closely track the facts of this case.
THE COURT:
those early

I think that comes from one of

(inaudible) decisions

MR. BENGE:

(inaudible).

I know I've seen it a number of

times in instruction packets, and I'm pretty sure it's
straight out of the case law, your Honor.
THE COURT:

I think one of the appellate

courts listed the time factor.

This is a gray area.

How much you should tell jurors about what kind of
things they may consider, but I think that the concept
is that they are

(inaudible) it's important to give ther

an idea what things to look for.

Certainly if you think

there are other factors that ought to be thrown in or
some that are poorly

(inaudible), mentioned in this

case, I think I think it is important to tell them the
kinds of things they can look at.
So your exception is noted and overruled on
that .
MR. SKORDAS:

Let me make certain that is all

I have.
I guess I have a concern overall that the jury

CitiCourt, LLC
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through its questioning

is concerned about, I den'

<r. :

how to cure, this but I don't think the instructions
a -- they're concerned about whether you can

zz

illegally

obtain prescriptions at the clinic some months or days
or weeks prior to the time it was charged, but what
we're dealing with is whether he illegally

possessed

them April 20th at the home that he and Cindy Drew lived
in in Moab.
THE COURT:

Maybe I can

add that to the

instruction about defendant has not been charged with
illegally distributing or prescribing.

(Inaudible) this

case is about, it's not about any of that other stuff.
It's about whether he legally possessed these drugs on
this date at this location.
MR. SKORDAS:

That would probably

crystallize

my concerns.
THE COURT:

This case is about whether

defendant possessed psilocin, hydrocodone, and/or
Demerol on April 20th, 2002.
MR. BENGE:

Is that going to go -- is this an

instruction of the defendant: has not been charged with
illegally prescribing controlled substances?

Is this

going right at the end?
THE COURT:
residence.

Yeah.

At the Cindy Drew

It is not about whether he violated -- did
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something wrong on some other dates.
MR. SK0RDA5:

How about that 7

That's fine.

MR. BENGE:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

All right.

I'll make that change.

That makes, I think, three instructions that I'm making
a change to.

I'll

fold the corners down so you can find

them quickly.
What I propose to do with the verdict form 13
just have one page with each count for them to choose
(inaudible).

Is that all right?

MR. SKORDAS:

Yes.

May I say something for

the record?
THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:
this morning.

Yes.
Obviously my client is not here

I talked to him about the nature of this

proceeding this morning before 8:00.

He's asked that

his appearance be waived, and I'd like to put that on
the record before he shows up.

I don't think it was

necessary for him to be present.
THE COURT:

No.

This is something we could

have done in chambers.
MR. SKORDAS:
MR. BENGE:

Thank you.
Your Honor, I know you're going to

prepare another set of amended instructions.
there were three.

You stated

I see the one where you said you were
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going to change hydrocodone and meperidine
and possessed.

is prescribed

Are you changing the one that you just

stated is the other one, just the -THE COURT:
on

it.

Changing possessed with the last 5

( Inaudible)
MR. BENGE

That won't change the order?

THE COURT:

That won't change the order or

change the section.
MR. BENGE

I just made a lot of adaptations

THE COURT:

Okay.

on my set.
Court will be in recess.

You can do whatever you want to do.
(Pause in proceedings).
THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Thank you for

being here today promptly, members of the jury.

Counsel

are here, defendant is here.
All right.

Counsel, here's copies of the

instructions for you with the changes we agreed to.
Here's a set for each one of the jurors.
Members of the jury, I'm going to read these
to you, and then Mr. Benge will address you, and then
Mr. Skordas will address you.

Because Mr. Benge has the

burden of proof, he'll get the last word.
will have about 30 minutes.

I'll

Each of them

let Mr. Benge know

when he has ten minutes left and Mr. Skordas when he has
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Addendum G

INSTRUCTION NO,

3

In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove eacn
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Those elements

are as follows:
COUNT I: POSSESSION OF PSILOCBIN IN A DRUG FREE ZONE
1.

That on or about April 20, 2002,

2.

Defendant possessed psilocm,

3.

In a drug free zone, and

4.

Knowing what it was and intending to possess it.

COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE IN A DRUG FREE
ZONE
1.
2.

That on or about April 20, 2002,
Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed

hydrocodone,
3.

In a drug free zone,

4.

Without a prescription or otherwise complying with

the law
COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION CF DEMEROL IN A DRUG FREE ZONE
1.
2.

That on or about April 20, 2 0 02,
Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed

demerol,

the law

3.

In a drug free zone,

4.

Without a prescription or otherwise complying with

If you believe that the state has proved each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
guilty.

If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements

beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. IQ
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must
still obtain a prescription for any controlled substances for
personal use.

Physicianrs licensed to dispense or administer

controlled substances are also permitted to possess reasonable
quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record
of controlled substances received for that purpose and dispensed
or administered by them as physicians.

A physician who fails to

comply with this requirement possesses those substances
illegally.

Addendum H

Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
SKORDAS & CASTON
Suite 810 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885
Attorneys for Defendant

In the Seventh Judicial District Court
In and For Grand County, State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION IN LIMINE

v.

Case No. 021700103

NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN,

Judge Lyle Anderson

Defendant.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Frederick Perm, by and through his attorney of record, Gregory
G. Skordas, hereby moves this court to limit the irrelevant statements made by informant, Lisa
LaPlante pursuant to Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.
On January 18, 2002, LaPlante provided the Moab City Police Department with a
Statement Form describing her interactions and observations of the Defendant in his medical
practice. Additional statements were made on January 21, 2002, January 29, 2002 and January
30, 2002. Many of the statements contained therein are either irrelevant, or if deemed relevant,
are unduly prejudicial and should be excluded on that basis.

Rule 402 states that irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Evidence is irrelevant if it has
no bearing on the defendant's guilt or innocence of the charged offense. See State v. Stephens.
667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). LaPlante's statements are not relevant to the charges of possession of
controlled substances. Many of the instances described in the January 18, 2002 statement are
regarding the Defendant's conduct at work. There are allegations of a sexual nature that are
totally unrelated to the possession charges. Further, LaPlante alleges the Defendant was
engaging in questionable practices with regard to his prescribing of certain medications,
something for which the Defendant is not charged in this case.
Evidence is limited to only those facts bearing on the Defendant's guilt or innocence of
the charged offenses. Therefore, LaPlante's testimony should be limited to only those facts
regarding the possession charges for which the Defendant is being tried.
DATED this Jl

day of l'C*A*r

, 2002.

SKORDAS & CASTON

Skordas

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the i 1 day of Nu.VJ
2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE was faxed and hand-delivered to the following:
William Benge
Grand County Attorney's Office
125 East Center Street
Moab, UT 84532
Fax: (435) 259-3926

Uc'r.'.^iA
Skordas & Caston

J

3

